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L Introduction
Over the past thirty years, judicial decisions and legislative revisions of
corporate statutes have reflected the belief that traditional norms of corporate
governance are not entirely applicable to closely-held corporations.' Although
the norms of centralized control and majority rule have served the needs of the
publicly-held corporation, they often create oppressive situations for minority
shareholders in the close corporation.2 For example, majority shareholder
control, coupled with the illiquidity of an investment in a close corporation,
may fuel a "squeeze-out!3 designed to flush the minority investor from the

entity.4
In the mid-1970s, courts began to modify the body of corporate law to
resolve the awkwardness that arises when close corporations are subject to
legal principles developed for larger entities.' One modem legal response has
1. See RobertB. Thompson, The Shareholder'sCauseofActionfor Oppression,48 BUS.
LAW. 699, 702 (1993) (stating that traditional corporate norms have proven unsuitable for close
corporations); Lori A. Lechner, Note, The Fateof Shareholdersof Closely Held Corporations
in the Wake ofBily v. Arthur Young, 34 CAL. W. L. REv. 245,257-58 (1997) (noting that courts
recognized special considerations of close corporations around 1970).
2. See Thompson, supra note 1, at 699 (recognizing that statutory norms of centralized
control and majority rule leave minority investor in close corporation in oppressive situations).
3. See F.H. O'NEAL & ROBERT B. THOMPSON, O'NEAL'S OPPREsSION OF MiNOR]TY
SHAREHOLDERs § 1.01, at 1-2 (2d ed. rev. 1991) (defining squeeze-out). O'Neal and Thompson
defined the term "squeeze-out" as follows:
By the term "squeeze-out" is meant the use by some of the owners or participants
in a business enterprise of the strategic position, inside information, or powers of
control, or the utilization of some legal device or technique, to eliminate from the
enterprise one or more of its owners or participants.... A squeeze-out normally
does not contemplate fair payment to the squeezees for the interests, rights, or
powers which they lose.
Id. In describing the causes of squeeze-outs, O'Neal and Thompson wrote:
The majority of squeeze-out cases are characterized by basic conflicts of interest
among the participants in the enterprise, protracted policy disagreements, prolonged
and bitter dissension prior to the squeeze play, or demonstrated inability of one or
more of the participants (because of habitual drinking or lack of business skills, for
example) to carry a fair share of the responsibility and work involved in operating
the business.
Id. § 2.02, at 3-4 (footnotes omitted).
4. See Thompson, supra note 1, at 699 (noting that traditional corporate norms may
result in squeeze-out).
5. See Donahue v. Rodd Electrotype Co., 328 N.E2d 505, 515 (Mass. 1975) (recogniz-
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been the enhancement of a majority shareholder's fiduciary obligations to a
minority shareholder in a closely-held corporation.6 This enhanced fiduciary
duty has created the opportunity for minority shareholders in the close corporation to bring an individual cause of action for breach of fiduciary duty
against majority shareholders. 7 In the recent decision of Granewich v.
Harding, the Oregon Supreme Court significantly expanded the protections
afforded to minority shareholders in close corporations by concluding that an
oppressed minority shareholder could state a claim of aiding and abetting the
breach of fiduciary duty against attorneys who assisted controlling shareholders in effecting a corporate squeeze-out."
The common law has long recognized that one who assists a fiduciary's
breach of duty may be liable for the harm caused."0 Imposing liability upon
ing unique nature of closely-held corporation and holding that stockholders in such entity owe
enhanced fiduciary duties); Thompson, supranote 1, at 700 (noting that courts resolved awkwardness in several ways).
6. See Donahue,328 N.E.2d at 515 (holding "that stockholders in the close corporation
owe one another substantially the same fiduciary duty in the operation of the enterprise that
partners owe to one another").
7. See Thompson, supra note 1, at 699 (noting that courts have expanded ability of
shareholders to bring direct, individual cause of action based on majority shareholder's breach
of fiduciary duty).
8. 985 P.2d 788 (Or. 1999).
9. See Granewich v. Harding, 985 P.2d 788, 795 (Or. 1999) (stating conclusion of
Oregon Supreme Court). In Granewich, the Oregon Supreme Court considered whether an
attorney could be held liable for aiding and abetting the breach of fiduciary duty in rendering
legal advice and assistance to controlling shareholders to effect a corporate squeeze-out. Id. at
790. Two controlling shareholders devised a plan to remove Granewich, a minority shareholder, from the corporation. Id. After that plan proved ineffective, the controlling shareholders hired a law firm to provide legal services to the corporation. Id. at 791. First, the attorneys
attempted to enforce the controlling shareholders' prior actions to remove the plaintiff from the
corporation. Id. The attorneys then assisted the controlling shareholders in exercising control
of the corporation in -ways inconsistent with their fiduciary duties by calling special meetings,
amending the corporate by-laws, removing the plaintiff as a director, and diluting the value of
the plaintiff's stock. Id. at 791-792. The plaintiff filed suit against the controlling shareholders
for breach of fiduciary duty and against the attorneys for aiding and abetting the breach of
fiduciary duty. Id. In analyzing the claims against the defendant-attorneys, the court initially
held that the defendant-attomeys personally need not have committed a tortious act as a
prerequisite to liability. Id. at 794. The Granewich court further noted that the defendantattorneys could be held liable in the absence of any duty directly flowing from the attorneys to
the plaintiff. Id. at 794-95. The court stated that the defendants' status as attorneys was
irrelevant to the resolution of the issue. Id. at 795. The Granewich court concluded that the
allegations were sufficient to demonstrate that the defendant-attomeys provided substantial
assistance to the controlling shareholders in the breach of fiduciary duties and could be held
liable for aiding and abetting the breach of fiduciary duty. Id. at 795-96. The court reversed
and remanded the case to the circuit court. Id.
10. See RESTATEMENT (SEcOND) OF TORTs § 874 cmt.c (1979) ("A person who knowingly assists a fiduciary in committing a breach of trust is himself guilty of tortious conduct and
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those who provide assistance to a fiduciary's breach of duty is consistent with
one of tort law's principal goals - deterring wrongful actions that result in
harm." Over the past twenty years, courts in a variety ofjurisdictions increas-

ingly have recognized "aiding and abetting the breach of fiduciary duty" as a
legitimate cause of action against individuals, including attorneys, who assist
in the breach of fiduciary duties. 2 Consequently, Granewich'smere recognition of an attorney's liability for assisting a breach of fiduciary duty is not
earth-shattering. Rather, Granewich's import rests in its extension of the
cause of action to the corporate squeeze-out, 3 in its conflict with the Model
Rules of Professional Conduct, 4 and in its ramifications for redefining an

attorney's obligations in close corporation squeeze-outs. 5

In light of the Granewich opinion, this Note analyzes the extension of
attorney liability for aiding and abetting the breach of fiduciary duty in the

corporate squeeze-out and discusses its implications for redefining the attorney's obligations in the representation of majority shareholders in a close
corporation. Part II provides a briefintroduction to primary liability and third-

party liability for breach of fiduciary duty. 6 Additionally, Part II outlines the
is subject to liability for the harm thereby caused."); 3 AM.JUR. 2D Torts § 299 (1986) ("A
person who intentionally causes or assists an agent to violate a duty to the principal is subject
to liability intort for the harm he has caused to the principal ....
").
11. See GCM, Inc. v. Ky. Cent Life Ins. Co., 947 P.2d 143,148 (N.M. 1997) (stating that
imposing aiding and abetting liability is consistent with goal oftort law).
12. See Thornton v. Evans, 692 F.2d 1064, 1082 (7th Cir. 1982) (holding that attorney
aided breach of fiduciary duty by preparing documents that furthered deceptive transfer of funds
to defraud union); FDIC v. Nathan, 804 F. Supp. 888, 896-97 (S.D. Tex. 1992) (holding
attorneys liable for aiding and abetting breach of fiduciary duties to savings association by
structuring, documenting, and closing loans that attorneys knew to be illegal); Amerifirst Bank
v. Bomar, 757 F. Supp. 1365, 1380 (S.D. Fla. 1991) ("[T]he majority of case law... recognizes
a cause of action for aiding and abetting common-law torts, such as breach of fiduciary duty.");
Katell v. Morgan Stanley Group, Inc., Fed. See. L. Rep. (CCI-) 97,437, 97,443 (Del. Ch.
1993) (recognizing action for aiding and abetting breach offiduciary duty under Delaware law);
Granewich v. Harding, 985 P.2d 788, 795-96 (Or. 1999) (allowing plaintiff to state claim of
aiding and abetting breach of fiduciary duty against attorney who assisted controlling shareholders' breach). But see Koutsoubos v. Casanave, 816 F. Supp. 472,475 (N.D. Ill.
1993) (dismissing claims against attorneys after finding that "Illinois has never recognized the tort of aiding
and abetting a breach of fiduciary duty"); Weingarten v. Warren, 753 F. Supp. 491, 496-97
(S.D.N.Y. 1990) (dismissing aiding and abetting claim against lawyer who was not in privity
with beneficiary in suit for diversion of trust assets).
13. See infra notes 200-31 and accompanying text (analyzing extension of cause of action
in squeeze-out).
14. See infra notes 232-64 and accompanying text (discussing conflict with Model Rules
of Professional Conduct).
15.
See infra notes 371-91 and accompanying text (discussing ramifications for redefining attorney's role in corporate squeeze-out).
16. See infra Part R (analyzing primary and third-party liability for breach of fiduciary
duty).
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traditional elements of common-law formulations of aiding and abetting the
breach of fiduciary
duty as a cause of action in light of cases decided prior to
GranewichY7 Part III details the intricacies of the Granewich decision,
focusing on the factual background and the analysis of both the Oregon Court
of Appeals and the Oregon Supreme Court.'8 Part IV analyzes Granewich in
light of the unique nature of the close corporation fiduciary, 9 prior applications of liability for aiding and abetting the breach of fiduciary duty,2" the
necessity for attorney involvement in a squeeze-out, and conflicts that the
case creates with the Model Rules of Professional Conduct.22 Part V.A
presents California case law addressing attorney assistance in the breach of
fiduciary duties owed to minority shareholders. 2 1 Part V.B reconciles differences in outcome between Granewich and California case law by examining
California's experiences with attorney liability to non-clients, 24 by contrasting
the principle of non-accountability against the substantive law of agency,
and by evaluating policy arguments regarding the extension of liability in the
squeeze-out context.26 Part VI of this Note proposes that Granewich signals
the need for redefining an attorney's role in the close corporation squeeze-out
and promotes a new conceptualization of an attorney's ethical obligations in
the squeeze-out.2 7 Finally, Part VII concludes that the conceptualization of an
attorney's obligations in a squeeze-out has lagged behind the evolution of the
close corporation fiduciary relationship.'

17. See infra Part H (outlining traditional elements of aiding and abetting liability).
18. See infraPart H (discussing Granewich).
19. See infraPart IVA (examining unique nature of close corporation fiduciary).
20. See infra Part IV.B (analyzing Granewich's consistency with prior applications of
liability for aiding and abetting breach of fiduciary duty).
21. See infra Part IV.C (discussing necessity for attorney involvement in squeeze-out).
22. See infra Part IV.D (examining ethical considerations under Model Rules of Profes-

sional Conduct).
23. See infra Part VA (discussing Skarbrevik v. Cohen, England & Whitfield, 282 Cal.
Rptr. 627 (Ct. App. 1991)).
24. See infra Part V.B.1 (analyzing California case law and statutes on attorney liability
to non-clients).
25. See infra Part V.B.2 (analyzing principle of non-accountability and substantive law

of agency).
26.
27.

See infraPart V.B3 (evaluating policy arguments).
See infra Part VI (discussing implication of Granewich for redefining attorney's role

in squeeze-out).
28. See infra Part VII (concluding that conceptualization of attorney obligations in
squeeze-out has lagged behind evolution of close corporation fiduciary relationships).
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I. Aiding andAbetting the Breach ofFiduciaryDuty as a Cause ofAction
A full understanding of liability for aiding and abetting the breach offiduciary duty must begin with a discussion of the primary fiduciary duty itself.
The legal conceptualization of fiduciary relationships arose from the area of
trusts.29 Over time, courts have extended fiduciary duties to a variety of legal
relationships including, but not limited to, agent-principal, director-corporation, guardian-ward, attorney-client, and majority shareholder-minority shareholder." It is the circumstances ofthese relationships, rather than contractual
obligations, that give rise to a fiduciary duty.3 1 While these aforementioned
relationships span a variety of circumstances, each individual relationship
poses the potential problem of an abuse of power. 2 Fiduciary jurisprudence
seeks to prevent that abuse ofpower by obligating a fiduciary "to exercise the
utmost loyalty to the interests" ofthe beneficiary.33 Indeed, the greatest minds
of American jurisprudence have recognized the high responsibility of a fiduciary, which Justice Cardozo characterized as "the punctilio of an honor the
most sensitive."34
As inspiring as Justice Cardozo's words have proven to be, fiduciary duty
jurisprudence is not the most concrete legal doctrine. Scholars have suggested
that the "sermonizing" of the courts "serves only to mask an underlying vagueness, or perhaps even emptiness, at the heart of the fiduciary concept."3 The
vague language of fiduciary jurisprudence, however, corresponds to the highly
contextualized nature of fiduciary relationships - relationships in which the
confines of duty are determined through analysis of "what a 'faithful steward'
would do in this particular circumstance."3 6 The contextual nature of the
fiduciary relationship thus requires that the fiduciary use the discretion with
which he has been vested to protect the vulnerability of the beneficiary.37 Yet,
the relationship involves more than protecting the vulnerable; it requires the
29. See Robert W. Tuttle, The Fiduciary'sFiduciary: LegalEthics in FiduciaryRepresentation, 1994 U. ILL. L. REV. 889, 896 (describing development of fiduciary duty jurisprudence).
30. See Meredith J. Duncan, LegalMalpractice by Any Other Name: Why a Breach of
FiduciaryDuty ClaimDoes Not Smell as Sweet, 34 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1137, 1149 (1999)
(discussing development of fiduciary duty jurisprudence); Tuttle, supranote 29, at 896 (same).
31. See Duncan, supra note 30, at 1150 (noting that law allows plaintiff to pursue cause
of action for breach of fiduciary duty in absence of contractual agreement between parties).
32. See id. at 1149 (discussing features offiduciary relationships).
33. Id. at 1150.
34. Meinhard v. Salmon, 164 N.E. 545, 546 (N.Y. 1928).
35.
Tuttle, supranote 29, at 896.
36. Id.
37. See id. at 897-99 (discussing fiduciary's discretion and vulnerability of beneficiary).
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fiduciary to act in the best interest of the beneficiary, rather than in the fiduciary's self-interest.3" A fiduciary who fails so to act may find himself liable
to the beneficiary, even in the absence of scienter or intent.39
Just as the fiduciary may be liable for breaching his duty, orthe "primary
duty," to the beneficiary, the common law has long recognized that one who
assists a fiduciary's breach of duty may be liable to the beneficiary." Scholars have called this basis of liability "third-party liability."4 Some plaintiffs
have pursued third-party liability for breach of fiduciary duty as counts of
conspiracy,42 while others have done so under the cause of action of aiding
and abetting the breach of fiduciary duty.43 This Note focuses primarily on

the latter.
A cause of action for aiding and abetting the breach of fiduciary duty
arises in the absence of any direct or "primary" duty to the plaintiff.' Consequently, aiding and abetting the breach of fiduciary duty is a "secondary
'
theor[y] of liability for a single civil wrong.""s
In this respect, it is a form of
vicarious liability with roots in the common law.46
38. See id.at 897-98 (discussing fiduciary's obligation to act in beneficiary's best interest).
39. See id. at 901 (noting that fiduciary is responsible for all breaches of duty, "whether
knowing or negligent, intentional or unintentional").
40. See Mertens v. Hewitt Assoc., 508 U.S. 248, 255 (1993) (stating that non-fiduciaries
have common-law duty to beneficiaries not to assist in fiduciary's breach).
41. See Tuttle, supra note 29, at 900-01 (discussing "third-party liability" for providing
assistance to fiduciary's breach of duty).
42. See Skarbrevik v. Cohen, England & Whitfield, 282 Cal. Rptr. 627, 629 (Ct. App.
1991) (noting that beneficiary filed conspiracy action against attorney who assisted client in
breach of fiduciary duty).
43. See Thornton v. Evans, 692 F.2d 1064, 1082 (7th Cir. 1982) (holding that attorney
aided breach of fiduciary duty by preparing documents that furthered deceptive transfer of funds
to defraud union); FDIC v. Nathan, 804 F. Supp. 888, 896-97 (S.D. Tex. 1992) (holding
attorneys liable for aiding and abetting breach of fiduciary duties to savings association by
structuring, documenting, and closing loans that attorneys knew to be illegal); Amerifirst Bank
v. Bomar, 757 F. Supp. 1365, 1380 (S.D. Fla. 1991) ("[T]he majority of case law... recognizes
a cause of action for aiding and abetting common-law torts, such as breach of fiduciary duty.");
Granewich v. Harding, 985 P.2d 788, 795-96 (Or. 1999) (allowing plaintiff to state claim of
aiding and abetting breach of fiduciary duty against attorney who assisted controlling shareholders' breach).
44. See Dudrow v. Ernst & Young, LLC, No. X-01-CV98-014421 IS, 1999 WL 78261,
at *8, *10 (Conn. Super. Ct. Sept 15, 1999) (upholding aiding and abetting breach of fiduciary
duty claim in absence of primary duty to plaintiff).
45. David F. Heroy & Lee C. Carter, Alternative Liability Theories for Fraudulent
Conveyances: Breach of FiduciaryDut, Conspiracy,Aiding andAbetting, Negligence and
ContributionRighs,inFRAuDULENTCoNvEYANEs,PREFERENCEs&VALUATIoN1994, at275,
301 (PLI Comm. Practice Course Handbook Series No. A4-4446,1994).
46. See Stanley Pietrusiak, Jr., Comment,Changingthe Natureof CorporateRepresentation: Attorney LiabilityforAidingandAbetting the Breach ofFiduciaryDuty, 28 ST. MARY'S
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In summarizing common-law traditions, the Restatement of Torts first
recognized the general tort of aiding and abetting over sixty years ago. 7 Section 876(b) of the Restatement (Second) of Torts provides that a defendant is
liable for harm resulting to a third person from the tortious conduct of another

if the defendant knows that the tortfeasor's conduct constitutes a breach of
duty and gives substantial assistance or encouragement to the tortfeasor in

such conduct.48 Courts commonly recognize Section 876(b) as mapping the
general confines of aiding and abetting liability in the entire spectrum of
tortious conduct, including products liability49 and negligence."

Numerous courts recognizing common-law formulations of aiding and
abetting the breach of fiduciary duty as a viable cause of action have done so
1
with reference to Section 876(b) of the Restatement (Second) of Torts."
Those courts generally advocate the following three elements in some combiL.. 213, 229-30 (noting that aiding and abetting liability is secondary liability theory grounded
in common law of agency and trusts).
47. See Patrick . McNulty & Daniel J. Hanson, LiabiliyforAiding and Abetting by
Silence or Inaction: An Unfounded Doctrine,29 TORT & INS. L.J. 14, 15 (1993) (stating that
drafters ofRestatement acknowledged tort of aiding and abetting in 1939).
48. RESTATehMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 876(b) (1979). In its entirety, Section 876 states:
For harm resulting to a third person from the tortious conduct of another, one is
subject to liability if he
(a) does a tortious act in concert with the other or pursuant to a common design
with him, or
(b) knows that the other's conduct constitutes a breach of duty and gives substantial assistance or encouragement to the other to so conduct himself, or
(c) gives substantial assistance to the other in accomplishing a tortious result and
his own conduct, separately considered, constitutes a breach of duty to the third
person.
Id. Subsection (a) is not applicable to aiding and abetting the breach of fiduciary duty because
the attorney usually has not committed a tortious act himself but merely has provided assistance
to client's commission of a tortious act Subsection (c) is not applicable because the attorney
generally does not owe a primary duty to the third person; rather, the attorney assists the client
in breaching a duty which the client owes to the third person.
49. See Ryan v. Eli Lilly & Co., 514 F. Supp. 1004, 1015-16 (D.S.C. 1981) (citing
subsection (b) in products liability case against drug manufacturer); Payton v. Abbott Labs, 512
F. Supp. 1031,1034-36 (D. Mass. 1981) (same).
50. See Lombardo v. Hoag, 566 A.2d 1185, 1188 (N.J. Super. Ct App. Div. 1989) (citing
subsection (b) in negligence case involving injuries stemming from intoxicated driver), overruledby 643 A.2d 550 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1993); Aebischer v. Reidt, 704 P.2d 531,533
(Or. Ct. App. 1985) (same).
51. See Kurker v. Hill, 689 N.E.2d 833, 837 (Mass. App. Ct. 1998) (noting that Section
876 of Restatement (Second) of Torts is germane to plaintiffs aiding and abetting breach of
fiduciary duty claim against attorney); OCM, Inc. v. Ky. Cent Life Ins. Co., 947 P.2d 143,147
(N.M. 1997) (recognizing aiding and abetting breach of fiduciary duty claim under Section 876
ofRestatement (Second)of Torts); Granewich v. Harding, 985 P.2d 788,792 (Or. 1999) (noting
that Section 876 of Restatement (Second)of Torts sets out three theories of liability for aiding
and abetting).
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nation.5 2 First, a plaintiff must prove the fiduciary breached his obligations
to the plaintiff. 3 Second, the plaintiff must prove that the defendant knowingly participated in or induced the breach. 4 Third, the plaintiff must prove
damages suffered as a result of the breach. 5
Two important considerations distinguish third-party liability from the
fiduciary's liability for breach of duty. 6 The first concerns injury to the
beneficiary. While a beneficiary need not prove actual harm in an action
against a fiduciary for breach of duty, a third party who assisted in the breach
is only liable if the beneficiary suffered actual harm.7 The second consideration involves the nature of liability. The fiduciary's liability for breach of
duty does not require a specific mental state.5 8 Consequently, a fiduciary who
unintentionally or unknowingly breaches his duty to a beneficiary is still
subject to liability. 9 In this sense, primary liability for breach of fiduciary
duty is essentially strict liability.' ° In contrast, third-party liability for breach
of fiduciary duty requires knowing participation inthe breach.6" That is, thirdparty liability is based on knowledge that the fiduciary's actions constitute a
breach of duty to the beneficiary.62
Indeed, "knowing participation!' in the fiduciary's breach of trust is the
gravamen of a claim of aiding and abetting a breach of fiduciary duty.6' Legal
authorities have rephrased knowing participation in a variety of ways, includ52. See Diduck v. Kaszycki& Sons Contractors, Inc., 974 F.2d 270,281-82 (2d Cir. 1992)
(stating elements of cause ofaction for aiding and abetting breach of fiduciary duty); S & K Sales
Co. v. Nike, Inc., 816 F.2d 843, 847-48 (2d Cir. 1987) (same); Nebenzahl v. Miller, No. 13206,
1993 Del. Ch. LEXIS 249, at *6-7 (Del. Ch. Nov. 8,1993) (same); In reWheelabrator Tech. Inc.
Shareholders Litig., No. 11495, 1992 Del. Ch. LEXIS 196, at *34 (Del. Ch. Sept. 1, 1992)
(same); GCM, Inc., 947 P.2d at 148 (same); see also Heroy & Carter, supra note 45, at 305
(same); Pietrusiak, supranote 46, at 233-34 (same).
53. S&KSalesCo.,816F.2dat847.
54. Id. at 847-48.
55. Id. at 848.
56. See Tuttle, supra note 29, at 901 (discussing two major differences between primary
and third-party liability for breach of fiduciary duty).
57. See id. (discussing differences in harm between primary and third-party liability for
breach of fiduciary duty).
58. See Diduck v. Kaszycki & Sons Contractors, Inc., 974 F.2d 270,282 (2d Cir. 1992)
(noting that fiduciary's liability for breach of duty does not turn on specific mental state).
59. See supranotes 29-39 and accompanying text (discussing primary liability for breach
of fiduciary duty).
60. See Tuttle, supra note 29, at 901 (noting that "fiduciary is responsible for all breaches
of duty").
61. See supranotes 51-55 and accompanying text (discussing elements of cause ofaction).
62. See Tuttle, supra note 29, at 901 (recognizing differences in level of knowledge
between primary and third-party liability for breach offiduciary duty).
63. Holmes v. Young, 885 P.2d 305,309 (Colo. Ct. App. 1994) (citing S & K Sales Co.
v. Nike, Inc., 816 F.2d 843, 848 (2d Cir. 1987)).
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ing "knowing assistance"' and "substantial assistance or encouragement."6
Although courts occasionally use the three phrases interchangeably,' it is
important to remember that these phrases embody two necessary elements of

an aiding and abetting claim. "Knowing participation" places emphasis on the
third party's knowledge ofthe fiduciary's status as a fiduciary and knowledge
that the fiduciary's action constitutes a breach of duty.67 "Substantial assistance" emphasizes the character and nature of assistance provided to the
fiduciary's breach of duty."a Granewichprovides the perspective for analyzing these two elements in light of aiding and abetting the breach of fiduciary
duty in the corporate squeeze-out context.69
HI Granewich v. Harding
In Granewich v. Harding," the Oregon court considered whether an
attorney could be held liable for aiding and abetting the breach of fiduciary
duty in rendering legal advice and assistance to majority shareholders to effect
a corporate squeeze-out 1' The corporation at issue formed in 1992, with
ownership split equally between Granewich, Harding, and AlexanderHegert.72 In May of 1993, Harding and Alexander-Hegert, the controlling
shareholders, met with Granewich to inform him that they had taken action to
remove him from the corporation by removing him as a director and by
terminating his employment as an executive of the corporation. 3 Granewich
objected to their actions on the grounds that the controlling shareholders
failed to provide notification of shareholders' or directors' meetings, that the
cumulative voting requirements of the by-laws protected his position on the
64. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 874 cmt c; (1979).
65. Id. § 876(b).
66. See S & K Sales Co. v. Nike, Inc., 816 F.2d 843, 849 (2d Cir. 1987) (using three
terms to describe level of participation required to sustain aiding and abetting breach of fiduciary duty claim).
67. See infra notes 133-75 and accompanying text (discussing knowing participation in
corporate squeeze-out).
68. See infra notes 176-99 and accompanying text (discussing substantial assistance in
corporate squeeze-out).
69. See supra note 9 (commenting on Granewich); infra notes 70-107 and accompanying
text (discussing facts of Granewich).
70. 985 P.2d 788 (Or. 1999).
71. See Granewich v. Harding, 985 P.2d 788,791 (Or. 1999) (stating issue).
72. See id. (noting that plaintiff and two defendants each owned one-third of corporation's stock).
73. See id. (stating that controlling shareholders met with plaintiff and informed him that
he had been removed as director, relieved of executive position, and terminated as employee of
corporation).
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board, and that the termination of his employment breached a prior agreement
that the corporation would permanently employ each shareholder. 4
After meeting with Granewich, the controlling shareholders, acting in
their corporate capacities, hired a law firm to provide legal services to the
corporation.7" Initially, the attorneys attempted to enforce the controlling
shareholders' earlier actions to remove Granewich from the corporation. 6 In
this respect, the attorneys drafted and sent to Granewich two letters containing
statements that Granewich alleged the attorneys knew to be false regarding the
effectiveness of the controlling shareholders' previous actions. 7 Once the
attorneys realized that their actions were "invalid and ineffective," they
undertook additional steps to remove Granewich from the corporation.7"
Granewich alleged that the attorneys "assisted [the controlling shareholders]
in exercising actual control of the management and policies of [the corporation] in ways inconsistent with their claimed fiduciary duties by calling
special meetings, amending corporate by-laws, removing [him] as a director,
and taking other actions to dilute the value of [his] stock. 7 9 Such actions
included removing the cumulative voting provision from the corporate bylaws and issuing shares of treasury stock to the controlling shareholders,
which reduced Granewich's interest in the corporation from one-third to less
than ten percent.8 0

74. See id. (noting that Granewich objected to his removal and termination on grounds
that he had not received any notice of meetings, that his termination was in contravention of
prior agreement between parties, and that those actions constituted breach of fiduciary duties
which defendants, as controlling shareholders, owed to him as minority shareholder).
75. See id. (stating that defendant controlling shareholders met with attorneys in "their
corporate capacities"). The complaint alleged that the corporation hired the lawyers, that the
corporation had no interest in the dispute between plaintiff and the controlling shareholders, and
that the work the attorneys performed was "outside of the scope of any legitimate employment
on behalf of the corporation." Id. at 795. The Oregon Supreme Court noted, however, that the
court of appeals erroneously referred to both the corporation and the individual shareholders
as clients of the attorneys. Id. at 794. The court indicated that whether the shareholders or the
corporation were the client of the attorney may not affect the outcome of the decision. Id.
76. See Granewich v. Harding, 945 P.2d 1071, 1075 (Or. Ct.App. 1997) (Armstrong, J.,
dissenting) (noting that attorneys attempted to enforce prior efforts of controlling shareholders
to remove Granewich from corporation), rev'd,985 P.2d 788 (Or. 1999).
77. See id. at 1068 (noting that attorneys sent two letters to Granewich regarding effectiveness of controlling shareholders' prior actions).
78. See id. at 1075 (Armstrong, J., dissenting) (noting that attorneys undertook plan of
action after learning that controlling shareholders' prior efforts were "invalid and ineffective").
79. Granewich v. Harding, 985 P.2d 788,791-92 (Or. 1999).
80. See Granewich v. Harding, 945 P.2d 1067, 1068 (Or. Ct App. 1997) (describing
attorneys' assistance), rev'd, 985 P.2d 788 (Or. 1999).
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Not surprisingly, Granewich sued the controlling shareholders for breach
of fiduciary duty.81 However, the lower court ultimately dismissed those
claims.82 Granewich also brought suit against the controlling shareholders'
attorneys.83 Rather than alleging that the attorneys acted in a direct, tortious
manner,8 4 (ranewich sought to hold the attorneys liable for substantially
assisting the controlling shareholders' breach offiduciary duties.85 The aiding
and abetting allegations against the attorneys became the central focus of the
case.
The trial court dismissed Granewich's complaint against the attorneys for
failure to state a claim,86 and a divided court of appeals affirmed.1 On appeal,
the court first considered whether the defendant-attorneys themselves owed
The court noted that the corporation
any fiduciary duty to the plaintiff
retained the defendant-attorneys.8 9 Consequently, no attorney-client relationship existed between Granewich and the defendant-attorneys. ° Inthe absence
of such a relationship, the attorneys had not entered into a fiduciary relation-

ship with Granewich.9"

81. See Granewich, 985 P.2d at 790 (describing allegations against controlling shareholders).
82. See id. ("As the case comes to us, all claims against the corporation and the [controlling] shareholders have been dismissed, and only the allegations concerning the lawyers' role
in the alleged squeeze-out are at issue."). The opinion does not state the reason why the claims
against the controlling shareholders were dismissed.
83. See id. (noting that Granewich named attorneys in complaint).
84. See Granewich, 945 P.2d at 1075 (stating that "there are no allegations that defendant-attorneys acted in a direct, tortious manner").
85. See Granewich v. Harding, 985 P.2d 788, 790 (Or. 1999) (describing allegations in
complaint). Granewich alleged that the attorneys assisted the controlling shareholders by
drafting and sending two letters to plaintiff, at the direction of controlling shareholders, containing statements that the lawyers knew to be false concerning the effectiveness of the controlling
shareholders' previous actions to remove plaintiff from the corporation. Id. at 791. Granewich
alleged, too, that the attorneys' provision of legal services constituted "substantial assistance"
to the controlling shareholders in breaching the fiduciary duties which they owed to him. Id.
86. See id. at 790 (noting that trial court dismissed complaint against attorneys for failure
to state claim).
87. See id. (stating that court of appeals affirmed trial court's dismissal of complaint
against attorneys). The supreme court noted that "all claims against the corporation and the
shareholders have been dismissed, and only the allegations concerning the lawyers' role in the
alleged squeeze-out are at issue." Id.
88. See Granewich v. Harding, 945 P.2d 1067, 1069 (Or. Ct. App. 1997) (considering
whether attorneys are "directly" liable to plaintiff), rev'd,985 P.2d 788 (Or. 1999).
89. See id. (noting that corporation hired attorneys).
90. See id. (stating that attorneys did not have attorney-client relationship with plaintiff).
91.
See id. (noting that in absence of attorney-client relationship, there is no fiduciary
duty owed to plaintiff in his personal capacity).
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After finding the attorneys owed no direct duty to the plaintiff, the court
of appeals considered whether the attorneys could be held liable for aiding and
abetting the breach of fiduciary duty by rendering legal advice and assistance
to the controlling shareholders.' The court of appeals recognized that Section
876(b) of the Restatement (Second)of Torts9' imposes liability upon one who
provides "substantial assistance" in the commission of a tort injuring a third
person. 4 The court of appeals noted, however, that the defendant-attorneys
could not be held liable for aiding and abetting the breach of fiduciary duty in
this case "because they could not commit 'the same tort with their own
hands."' 95 In the view ofthe court of appeals, the defendant-attorneys were not
liable for aiding and abetting the breach of fiduciary duty because they were
not in a fiduciary relationship withthe plaintiff.9 6 Inthis respect, it appears that
the court of appeals confused the distinction between primary and third-party
liability for the breach of fiduciary duty.' The reluctance of the court of
appeals to hold the attorneys liable appears to be influenced, in large part, by
the fact that Oregon courts had not previously recognized aiding and abetting
the breach of fiduciary duty as a cause of action.9" The court of appeals buttressed its decision with the policy consideration that holding the attorneys
liable in this circumstance could undermine attorney-client relationships and
damage the corporate attorney's role in other situations. 9
The Oregon Supreme Court noted that the court of appeals "found dispositive the absence of any duty flowing directly from the lawyers to plaintiff." 00 However, the supreme court concluded that the lower court's reasoning was flawed in two respects." 1 First, in stating that the defendant-attorneys
92. See id. (stating that issue is whether attorneys can be held liable for their role in
rendering legal advice and assistance).

93.

REsTATEmENT (SEcOND) OF

TORTS § 876(b) (1979). "For harm resulting to a third

person from the tortious conduct of another, one is subject to liability if he.. . (b) knows that
the other's conduct constitutes a breach of duty and gives substantial assistance or encouragement to the other so to conduct himself. . . ." Id.
94. Granewich v. Harding, 945 P.2d 1067,1072 (Or. Ct. App. 1997),rev'd,985 P.2d 788
(Or. 1999).
95. Id. at 1073.
96. See id. (noting that defendant-attorneys did not owe fiduciary duty to plaintiff and
could not be held vicariously liable for breach of that duty).
97. See supra notes 40-46 and accompanying text (discussing distinction between primary
and third-party liability for breach of fiduciary duty).
98. See Granewich, 945 P.2d at 1074 (noting that cause of action has not previously
existed under Oregon law).
99. See id. (discussing policy implications of extending liability in this circumstance); see
also infra notes 350-70 and accompanying text (discussing policy arguments).
100. Granewich v. Harding, 985 P.2d 788,794 (Or. 1999).
101. See id. at 794-95 (noting two flaws in court ofappeals's analysis).
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could not be liable because they did not owe the plaintiff any fiduciary duty,
the court of appeals erroneously fused together Subsections 876(a) and 876(c)
of the Restatement (Second) of Torts."° Second, prior Oregon case law
established that "not all persons acting in concert need to have committed an
overt tortious act against the plaintiff' in order to be held liable. 3 After
holding that a defendant need not personally have committed a tortious act as
a prerequisite to liability, the supreme court briefly addressed the lower
court's policy justifications for refusing to extend liability.'( 4 In direct opposition to the appellate court's approach, the supreme court tersely refused to
carve out an exception to aiding and abetting liability for attorneys in this
05
circumstance, noting that the defendants' "status as lawyers is irrelevant."
The supreme court concluded that the allegations were sufficient to demonstrate that the defendant-attorneys provided substantial assistance to the
controlling shareholders in the breach of fiduciary duties.' 6 Consequently,
Supreme Court reversed and remanded the case to the circuit
the Oregon
07
court.

1

IV Analysis of Granewich
For the corporate attorney, the import of Granewich does not rest in the
Oregon court's holding that a defendant may be held liable as a tortfeasor in
the absence of anytortious behavior by the defendant personally.' While the
majority opinion ofthe court of appeals may have misread applicable Oregon
law on that issue,"° tort law has long recognized assistance and encouragement, as opposed to active participation, as a basis for liability." 0 Rather, the
very heart of Granewich's importance rests in an issue summarily dismissed
by the Oregon Supreme Court: Whether the defendants' status as lawyers is
102. See id. at 794 (noting incorrect interpretation by court ofappeals).
103. Id. at 795.
104. See id. (addressing policy issues of holding defendant-attorneys liable).
105. Id.
106. See id. at 795-96 (concluding that complaint states claim against defendant-attorneys
based on their alleged participation in breach of duties owed to plaintiff).
107. See id. (reversing and remanding).
108. See id.at 794 (holding that "a defendant personally need not have committed a tortious
act as a prerequisite to liability for acting in concert with another person who did commit that
tortious act").
109. See Granewich v. Harding, 945 P.2d 1067, 1079 (Armstrong, J., dissenting) ("There
is no requirement in Oregon law that defendants must be legally capable of committing the
underlying tortious acts or that they must do anything other than join the conspiracy."), rev'd,
985 P.2d 788 (Or. 1999).
110. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 876 cmt. b (1979) (noting that one who
gives advice or encouragement to tortfeasor is himself tortfeasor and is liable).
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truly irrelevant to the disposition of the case. In order to assess that issue, four
aspects of attorney liability for aiding and abetting the breach of fiduciary
duty, discussed in light of Granewich, are revealing: (a) the nature of the
fiduciary relationship in the close corporation,"' (b) traditional common-law
conceptualizations of substantial assistance," 2 (c) the necessity for attorney
involvement in squeeze-outs,"' and (d) ethical dilemmas posed by the extension of aiding and abetting liability in this context." 4
A. The Unique Nature of FiduciaryDuty in the Close Corporation
As an initial matter, the unique nature of the close corporation fiduciary
relationship strains the wholesale importation of prior applications of liability
for aiding and abetting the breach of fiduciary duty to the close corporation
squeeze-out context." 5 Given the highly contextual nature of a fiduciary's
responsibilities to a beneficiary," 6 it is not surprising that fiduciary relationships will vary from one relationship to the next.' Despite the undercurrent
of acting in the best interest of the beneficiary, fiduciary relationships differ
in the degree to which "a fiduciary's own self interest intermingles with the
beneficiary's best interest.""' In the trust relationship, for example, a trustee
generally has no valid self-interested involvement in the trust."9 Inthe trust
setting, then, the line between appropriate conduct and conduct that breaches
a fiduciary duty is somewhat clear. 2 ' However, in the close corporation setting, the controlling shareholder as a fiduciary "legitimately pursues his own
self-interest through the fiduciary relationship."''
Indeed, because the fiduciary concept is so flexible, "it is likely that the duty will vary depending on
the fiduciary's motive and the offensiveness of the conduct as perceived by
111.
See infra notes 115-25 and accompanying text (discussing nature of fiduciary relationship in close corporation).
112. See infra notes 126-99 and accompanying text (analyzing traditional common-law
conceptualizations of substantial assistance).
113. See infra notes 200-31 and accompanying text (discussing necessity of attorney
involvement in corporate squeeze-outs).
114. See infra notes 232-64 and accompanying text (discussing ethical considerations).
115. See Tuttle, supra note 29, at 948 (noting unique nature of close corporation fiduciary).
116. See supra notes 35-38 and accompanying text (noting contextual nature of fiduciary
relationship).
117. See Tuttle, supra note 29, at 948 (stating that all fiduciaries are not alike).
118. Id.
119. See id. (stating that trustee generally has no self interest in relationship). This
assumption is made, however, contingent upon the fact that the trustee is not also a beneficiary.
When a trustee is a beneficiary, the relationship becomes more complicated. Id.
120. See id. (noting that fiduciary duty is more clear in trust setting).
121. Id.
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the court."'12 Understandably, the line between appropriate conduct and
breaching conduct is less clear in the close corporation setting. Consequently, the corporate attorney's task is more difficult because the nature of
the relationship and the standard of appropriate conduct are clouded, at least
to a degree, by a permissible modicum of self-interest on the part of the
fiduciary."2 Moreover, even though some decisions suggest that the fiduciary
obligations of the majority shareholder are quite stringent, 124 others have
tempered that language with the competing interests of the business judgment
rule. lu What constituted substantial assistance to a fiduciary's breach in
prior applications of aiding and abetting the breach of fiduciary duty outside
of the corporate squeeze-out context, then, may not square well with the
realities of the close corporation fiduciary, despite the strength of the logical
analysis.
B. TraditionalConceptualizationsof Knowing Participationand
SubstantialAssistance
In Granewich,the Oregon Supreme Court devoted the bulk of its analysis
to the issue of whether one could be liable for participating in a breach of
duty. 26 After concluding that legal authorities were unanimous in their support of the proposition that one could be held liable for assisting in the breach
of fiduciary duty, 27 the court concisely stated that the principle "readily
extends to lawyers.""r Although the court recognized that substantial assistance is a key element of the cause of action, 2 9 any discussion of the limits of
substantial assistance clearly is lacking fromthe opinion. The absence of such
a discussion is troubling for two reasons. First, as previously recognized,
substantial assistance is the dispositive issue in a claim of aiding and abetting
122. O'NEAL & THOMPSON, supra note 3, § 7.03, at 13-14.
See Tuttle, supranote 29, at 948 (noting that lawyer's task in close corporation setting
123.
is more difficult because line between acceptable and prohibited conduct is less distinct).
124.
See O'NEAL & THOMPSON, supra note 3, § 7.04, at 38 (discussing enhanced fiduciary
duty in close corporation).
125. See id. § 7.04, at 39 (noting cases that temper enhanced fiduciary duty with business
judgment rule).
126. See Oranewich v. Harding, 985 P.2d 788, 793-95 (Or. 1999) (analyzing issue of
whether Oregon recognizes cause of action against defendant for assisting another's breach of
fiduciary duty).
127. See id. at 793-94 ("Legal authorities, however, are virtually unanimous in expressing
the proposition that one who knowingly aids another in the breach of a fiduciary duty is liable
to the one thereby harmed.").
128. Id. at 794.
129. See id. at 795 (noting that complaint alleged that attorneys provided substantial
assistance to breach).
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the breach of fiduciary duty.13 ° Second, interpretations of the limits of substantial assistance frequently determine the outcome of a given case. 3'
Given the lack of discussion in Granewich regarding the limits of substantial assistance, the case must be analyzed according to prior common-law
conceptualizations of substantial assistance. Traditional understandings of
substantial assistance typically turn on two factors: (i) the defendant's knowledge of the fiduciary's duty and breach, and (ii) the amount of participation
required to reach the level of substantial assistance. 3 ' Accordingly, this Note
will analyze Granewich in that framework.
1. Knowing Participation:The Requisite Degree ofKnowledge
Knowing participationin a fiduciary's breach of duty requires both knowledge as to the primary violator's status as a fiduciary and knowledge that the

primary violator's conduct contravenes his fiduciary duty.'33 This approach

echoes the standards announced in the Restatement (Second).134 The Restatement (Second), however, fails to define "knowledge.""I3S Unfortunately, general tort standards of knowledge have been only of limited help in assessments
of liability for aiding and abetting the breach of fiduciary duty.'36 Consequently, courts have reached divergent results, and the question of whether
actual knowledge or constructive knowledge is sufficient has not been decided
conclusively, but may turn upon the specific facts of each case.'37 To further
130. See Holmes v. Young, 885 P.2d 305,309 (Colo. Ct App. 1994) (noting that substantial assistance is gravamen of aiding and abetting breach of fiduciary duty claim (citing S & K
Sales Co. v. Nike, Inc., 816 F.2d 843, 848 (2d Cir. 1987))).
131. See Pietrusiak, supra note 46, at 234-35 ("Courts that have found insufficient evidence to support aiding and abetting liability have generally staked their holdings on their interpretations of the limits of 'substantial assistance."').
132. See William H. Kuehnle, SecondaryLiability Under the FederalSecurities Laws Aiding andAbetting, Conspiracy,ControllingPerson,andAgency: Common-Law Principles
and the Statutory Scheme, 14 1 CORP. L. 313, 322 (1989) (stating that elements that cause
greatest difficulty are knowledge and substantial assistance).
133. See Diduck v. Kaszycki & Sons Contractors, Inc., 974 F.2d 270, 282-83 (2d Cir.
1992) (stating two elements of knowing participation in fiduciary's breach of duty).
134. See RESTATEMENT (SEcOND) OF TORTS § 876(b) (1979) (stating knowledge requirements).
135. See Kuehnle, supranote 132, at 322 (stating thatRestatement(Second)fails to define
knowledge).
136. See id.(noting that general tortfeasor liability precedent is of limited help in addressing knowledge issues of aiding and abetting breach of fiduciary duty).
137. Compare Terrydale Liquidating Trust v.Barness, 611 F. Supp. 1006,1027 (S.D.N.Y.
1984) (requiring actual knowledge under circumstances of case), with Diduck, 974 F.2d at 283
(stating that constructive knowledge is sufficient), and Donovan v. Schmoutley, 592 F. Supp.
1361, 1396 (D. Nev. 1984) (requiring only constructive knowledge that fiduciary's conduct is
breach of duty).
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complicate the matter, scholars widely have accepted the premise
that proving
1 38
knowledge is nearly impossible in aiding and abetting cases.
Despite problems in defining and determining knowledge, the outcome of
at least one case addressing attorney liability for aiding and abetting the breach
of fiduciary duty turned on the definition of knowledge.1 39 In Holmes v.
Young,' the Colorado Court of Appeals addressed an attorney's liability for
141
aiding and abetting the breach of fiduciary duty in the partnership context.
Resolution of the attorney's liability for aiding and abetting the general partner's breach of fiduciary duty turned on the question of knowledge. 42 The
Holmes courtnotedthe disagreement betweenjurisdictions over whether actual
or constructive knowledge was necessary to sustain the cause of action. 43 The
Colorado court refused to resolve that question, however, finding that the
defendant-attorney could not have known that the client would breach the
fiduciary duties owed to the plaintiff." The result inHolmes is sensible, as the
1 45
breach of duty occurred well after the attorney's involvement in the matter.
In the corporate squeeze-out, however, the breach occurs contemporaneously
with the attorney's involvement.
138. See Kuehnle, supranote 132, at 324 (stating that knowledge is difficult to prove); Me'Nulty & Hanson, supranote 47, at 14 (stating that knowledge of tortious act generally is proven
by circumstantial evidence); Pietrusiak, supra note 46, at 235 (stating that actual knowledge is
non-existent in aiding and abetting situations).
139. See Holmes v. Young, 885 P.2d 305, 310 (Colo. Ct. App. 1994) (noting that defendant-attorney could not have known that his client would breach fiduciary duty).
140. 885 P.2d 305 (Colo. Ct. App. 1994).
141. See Holmes v. Young, 885 P.2d 305, 307 (Colo. Ct App. 1994) (stating issue). In
Holmes, the court addressed whether an attorney representing a partnership could be held liable
for aiding and abetting the breach of fiduciary duty owed to a limited partner. Id. The plaintiff
was a limited'partner in a Colorado limited partnership the purpose of which was to develop or
to dispose of real estate it had acquired. Id. The defendant-attorney had represented the limited
partnership in a prior civil action and was the signatory officer on a bank account of the limited
partnership maintained for the purpose of disbursing money received from the settlement of that
action. Id. After negotiations with the plaintiff, the attorney turned the account over to the
corporate general partner, who was to make payments to the plaintiff. Id. Four years later, the
corporate general partner stopped making payments to the plaintiff. Id. The plaintiff brought
suit against the defendant-attorney alleging aiding and abetting the breach of fiduciary duty.
Id. at 308. Relying on Section 874, comment c, and Section 876(b) to the Restatement(Second)
of Torts, the court noted that to be liable the defendant must have known that the corporate
general partner would fail in its obligations and would breach its duty when the defendantattorney turned the money over to the general partner. Id. at 309. The court concluded that the
attorney could not have known of the breach. Id. Therefore, the court upheld the lower court's
judgment for the attorney. Id. at 310.
142. See id. at 309 (analyzing issue of knowledge).
143. See id. (noting discrepancies in legal standard).
144. See id. (refusing to resolve dispute and noting that defendant could not have known,
or even have been on notice, that corporate general partner would breach fiduciary duty).
145. See id. at 307 (noting that breach occurred four years after attorney delivered funds).
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Even though the determination of whether actual or constructive knowledge is required varies from one jurisdiction to the next, the Minnesota
Supreme Court recently synthesized the law in an attempt to resolve the dispute. 46 In Witzman v. Lehrman, Lehrman & Flom, 47 the Minnesota Supreme
Court noted that knowledge is evaluated best in tandem with substantial
assistance.148 Whether the requisite degree of knowledge exists "depends in
' The Minnesota
part on the particular facts and circumstances of each case."149

court noted that constructive knowledge has been deemed sufficient in those
cases in which the aider-and-abettor has maintained a long-term or in-depth
relationship with the fiduciary. 5 Actual knowledge of the fiduciary's breach
of duty, however, has been required "where the conduct is not a facial breach
of duty." ' Regarding the knowledge issue specific to that case, the Witzman
court concluded that the fiduciary's actions "were not clear violations of the
broad discretionary authority he held."'152 Accordingly, the Minnesota court
applied the actual knowledge standard in that case.' 53
146. See Witzman v. Lehrman, Lehrman & Flor, 601 N.W.2d 179, 188 (Minn. 1999)
(synthesizing case law on knowledge requirements for aiding and abetting).
147. 601 N.W.2d 179 (Minn. 1999).
148. See Witzman v. Lehrman, Lehrman & Flor, 601 N.W.2d 179, 188 (Minn. 1999)
(stating that courts should evaluate in tandem knowledge and substantial assistance). In Witzman, the Minnesota Supreme Court addressed, inter alia, an accounting firm's liability for aiding
and abetting a trustee's breach of fiduciary duty. Id. at 181-82. Although refusing to grant a
wholesale exemption to professionals from liability for aiding and abetting, the court stated that
it would strictly and narrowly construe the elements of such a claim to limit professionals'
liability. Id. at 187. The court first evaluated the knowledge requirement of aiding and abetting,
concluding that the requisite degree of knowledge depended on the specific facts of the case.
Id. at 188. Because the fiduciary's breach was not a clear violation of his authority, the court
concluded that the defendant-accountants had to possess actual knowledge of the breach in
order to be liable. Id. The Minnesota court found that the defendant-accountants lacked actual
knowledge. Id. Turning to the substantial assistance element, the Minnesota court stated that
professional liability for aiding and abetting required more than the mere provision of routine
professional services. Id. at 189. The defendant-accountants had provided assistance by
preparing financial statements and drawing up accounts. Id. The court concluded that such
activity was routine and insufficient to constitute substantial assistance. Id. The Witzman court
held that the plaintiff had failed to state a claim of aiding and abetting the breach of fiduciary
duty against the defendant-accountants. Id.
149. Id. at 188.
150. See id. ("In cases where the primary tortfeasor's conduct is clearly tortious or illegal,
some courts have held that a defendant with a long-term or in-depth relationship with that
tortfeasor may be deemed to have constructive knowledge that the conduct was indeed tortious."
(citing Diduck v. Kaszycki & Sons Contractors, Inc., 974 F.2d 270,283-84 (2d Cir. 1992))).
151. Id. (citing Future Group H v. NationsBank, 478 S.E.2d 45,50 (S.C. 1996)).
152. Id.
153. See id. (refusing to infer that aiding-and-abetting defendant possessed actual knowledge of fiduciary's breach).
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The Witzman court's clarification provides a workable baseline for determining whether constructive or actual knowledge is required for attorney
liability for aiding and abetting the breach of fiduciary duty in a corporate
squeeze-out. By linking the determination of the requisite degree of knowledge to the particular type of assistance provided, the Witzman solution allows
for a more flexible, albeit less predictable, determination of liability. Thus,
attorneys who have committed more egregious acts of assistance or who have
assisted in breaches of duty over an extended period oftime will be held to the
lower standard of knowledge. Although the Restatement (Second) does not
assess substantial assistance with respect to the length of the relationship
between the primary tortfeasor and the aider and abettor, at least one court has
recognized that length of relationship is an important factor in the analysis." 4
In the context of attorney liability for aiding and abetting a majority
shareholder in the breach of fiduciary duty in a corporate squeeze-out, however, final resolution of the knowledge issue is probably of relatively little
practical importance. Knowledge, as defined in prior aiding and abetting
cases, essentially has two requirements.155 The first is knowledge as to the
primary violator's status as a fiduciary.15 Most likely, corporate counsel will
be familiar with the status of fiduciary duty jurisprudence and, in turn, will
know whether a majority shareholder stands in a fiduciary relationship with
a minority shareholder in the applicable jurisdiction. The second requirement
is knowledge that the primary's conduct constitutes a breach of fiduciary
duty. 57 Once again, corporate counsel most likely will be cognizant that
certain squeeze-out techniques may violate the majority shareholder's fiduciary obligations. Thus, it is probable that a corporate attorney may satisfy the
higher actual knowledge standard in the context of a corporate squeeze-out.
One must be careful not to confuse knowledge of the defendant's breach
with an intent to harm the plaintiff. Admittedly, the line between the two is
not a bright one, but a number of decisions confronting aiding and abetting
liability under the Restatement (Second) of Torts conclude that assistance in
a fiduciary's breach of duty does not require proof of wrongful intent."5 That
154. See Halberstam v. Welch, 705 F.2d 472, 484 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (adding sixth factor of
mlength of relationship" to Restatement's five-part test for determining substantial assistance);
infra note 179 (discussing facts and analysis ofHalberstam).
155. See supra note 133 and accompanying text (stating that relevant knowledge is
knowledge as to primary's status as fiduciary and knowledge that primary's conduct constitutes
violation of duty).
156. See supra note 133 and accompanying text (noting first requirement of knowledge).
157. See supranote 133 and accompanying text (noting second requirement of knowledge).
158. See Diduck v. Kaszycki & Sons Contractors, Inc., 974 F.2d 270,282 (2d Cir. 1992)
("No intent to harm need be proven in connection with a knowing participation claim." (citing
S & K Sales Co. v. Nike, Inc., 816 F.2d 843, 849 (2d Cir. 1987))); S & K Sales Co., 816 F.2d
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principle logically extends from an understanding that a primary violation of
fiduciary duty itself requires no specific mental state. 9 Rather, in order to
find a defendant liable for aiding and abetting the breach of fiduciary duty,
'the factflnder is required only to find that the defendant knew of the breach
of duty and participated in it.""eo
Even though the Supreme Court has abolished causes of action for aiding
and abetting under certain provisions of federal securities laws,' analysis of
those prior aiding and abetting cases under federal securities laws provides a
deeper understanding of the broad nature of common-law formulations of
aiding and abetting liability. Indeed, common-law formulations of aiding and
abetting the breach of fiduciary duty differ from aiding and abetting liability
under the federal securities laws, and courts have carefully distinguished the
two types of aiding and abetting liability in this respect.162 The differentiation
especially is notable with respect to issues of intent. For example, a primary
violation of fiduciary duty under certain provisions of the federal securities

laws requires an intent to defraud. 6 Likewise, liability for aiding and abet-

ting under the federal securities laws requires a specific .intentto assist in the
breach."
The fact that courts have applied common-law formulations of aiding and
abetting liability under federal statutes that do not proscribe aiding and abetat 848 (noting that lower court's refusal to instruct on -wrongful intent was proper); Holmes v.
Young, 885 P.2d 305, 309 (Colo. Ct. App. 1994) (stating that wrongful intent is not necessary
element (citing S & KSales Co., 816 F.2d at 848)).

159. See Diduck, 974 F.2d at 282 (noting that fiduciary's liability for breach of duty does
not turn on intent).
160.

S&KSalesCo.,816F.2dat848.

161. See Cent. Bank v. First Interstate Bank, 511 U.S. 164, 191 (1994) (holding that
private plaintiff may not maintain aiding and abetting suit under Securities Exchange Act
§ 10(b)). In Central Bank, the Supreme Court settled the question of whether private civil
liability under section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 extends to those who aid
and abet a manipulative or deceptive practice under that statute. Id. at 167. The court stated
the "uncontroversial conclusion" that the text of the 1934 Act does not itself reach those who
aid and abet a section 10(b) violation. Id.at 177. Thus, the court concluded that section 10(b)
does not create an implied cause of action for aiding and abetting violations of that provision.
Id. at 177-78; see also Theodore Sonde & Jennifer L. Kim, The Evolution of Professional
Liability- A Work in Progress,SC88 ALI-ABA 277, 280 (1998) (stating that CentralBank

clearly eliminated certain private causes of action against attorneys and accountants under
federal securities laws).
162. See Diduck, 974 F.2d at 282 (noting that defendants' reliance on securities laws to
dismiss cause of action is misplaced).
163. See Ernst & Ernst v. Hochelder, 425 U.S. 185, 197 (1976) (discussing primary
liability under federal securities laws).
164. See DiLeo v. Ernst & Young, 901 F.2d 624, 628 (7th Cir. 1990) (noting that aiding
and abetting under federal securities laws requires specific intent to assist in breach).
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ting as a cause of action complicates the distinction between common-law and

federal statutory bases of liability.165 For example, in Diduck v. Kaszycki &

Sons Contractors, Inc.," the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit ad-

dressed liability for aiding and abetting the breach of fiduciary duty under the
Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA).167 Even though
ERISA does not address liability for aiding and abetting the breach of fiduciary duty, the court concluded that one who knowingly participates in a
fiduciary's breach of duty under that federal statute could be held liable under
common-law formulations of aiding and abetting the breach of fiduciary
duty." Because aiding and abetting liability in that case was derived from the
common law, rather than from a statutory basis, the court concluded that no
specific intent was required in order to hold the defendant liable for aiding
and abetting. 169
A minority ofjurisdictions analyzing the claim under common-law traditions, however, places an emphasis on intent in determining whether an
attorney should be held liable for aiding and abetting the breach of fiduciary
duty.170 For example, the California courts have required a defendant-attorney
165. See Diduck v. Kaszycki & Sons Contractors, Inc., 974 F.2d 270,281 (2d Cir. 1992)
(supplementing federal statute with common-law formulations of aiding and abetting breach of
fiduciary duty).
166. 974 F.2d 270 (2d Cir. 1992).
167. Diduck v. Kaszycki & Sons Contractors, Inc., 974 F.2d 270, 270 (2d Cir. 1992)
(stating issue). In Diduck,the Second Circuit considered, inter alia, whether a third party could
be held liable for aiding and abetting the breach of fiduciary duty under the Employee Retirement
Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA). The Trump Organization, Inc., aided and abetted a union
official in the breach of his fiduciary duties by knowingly participating in a scheme to defraud
a union pension fund. Id. at 274-75. The court initially considered whether common-law
formulations of aiding and abetting breach of fiduciary duty should supplement the rights
provided in ERISA. Id. at 281. The court concluded that allowing the cause of action under
ERISA was consistent with the statute's purposes, holding that one who knowingly participates
in an ERISA fiduciary's breach of duty is jointly and severally liable with the fiduciary for
resulting damages under ERISA. Id. Turning to the elements of aiding and abetting the breach
of fiduciary duty, the court of appeals stated that the plaintiff need not prove intent to harm in
connection with a knowing participation claim. Id. at 282. The court then addressed the
question of whether a defendant charged with aiding and abetting liability must possess either
actual or constructive knowledge. Id.at 282-83. The court concluded that constructive knowledge was sufficient. Id. at 283. Finally, the court considered what level of participation by the
Trump defendants was necessary to sustain the aiding and abetting claim. Id. at 284. The court
concluded that one participates in a fiduciary's breach if he affirmatively assists, helps conceal,
or fails to act when required to do so. Id.
168. See id. at 281 (allowing common-law formulations to supplement federal statute).
169. See id.at 282 (stating that plaintiff need not prove intent).
170. See Skarbrevik v. Cohen, England & Whitfield, 282 Cal. Rptr. 627, 639 (Cal. Ct.
App. 1991) (requiring nonfiduciary attorney to act "infurtherance of [his] own financial gain"
in order to be liable for aiding and abetting breach of fiduciary duty); Tuttle, supra note 29, at
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to have acted in furtherance of his own financial gain in order for aiding and
abetting liability to attach. 7 1 California's focus on intent, however, may be
based upon a general California rule against holding an individual liable for
assisting in the violation of a duty when that individual was not personally
bound by the duty. 172 Legal scholarship has suggested that the California
approach represents the proposition "that lawyers who act as agents, and not
as principals furthering their own interests, do not act as 'participants' in their
clients' breach of duty.1173 Ilinois courts have echoed a focus on intent in
determining substantial assistance by requiring an attorney to act from personal malice or a desire for personal profit in order to trigger liability for
aiding a fiduciary in the breach of duty." 4 While this focus on intent appears
to provide greater protection to attorneys that perform legal services for
clients but do not actively participate in the breach, at least one court has
determined that the receipt of legal fees is a basis for concluding that an
attorney "participated" in his client's breach of fiduciary duty for his own
financial gain.7 5
2. SubstantialAssistance: Level of Participation
The Restatement (Second)of Torts sets out a five-part balancing test for
176
determining whether the assistance given rises to the level of "substantial."
929 (noting that Illinois requires nonfiduciary attorney to act from personal malice or desire for
personal profit in order to trigger aiding and abetting liability (citing Schott v. Glover, 440
N.E.2d 376,379 (111.
App. Ct.1982))).
171.
See Skarbrevik, 282 Cal. Rptr. at 639 (requiring nonfiduciary attorney to act "in
furtherance of [his] own financial gain"); infra notes 267-301 and accompanying text (discussing Skarbrevikin detail).
172. See City ofAtascadero v. Merril Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 80 Cal. Rptr.
2d 329, 342 (Ct. App. 1999) ("As a general rule, a cause of action for civil conspiracy will not
arise if the alleged coconspirator, even though a participant in some agreement underlying the
injury, was not personally bound by any duty violated by the wrongdoing.") (emphasis added).
173. Tuttle, supranote 29, at 930; see also infra notes 309-39 and accompanying text (discussing California's experience with attorney liability to non-clients).
174. See Tuttle, supra note 29, at 929 (noting that Illinois requires nonfiduciary attorney
to act from personal malice or desire for personal profit in order to trigger aiding and abetting
liability (citing Schott v. Glover, 440 N.E.2d 376, 379 (1. App. Ct. 1982))). But see Wiebolt
Stores, Inc. v. Schottenstein, No. 878C811, 1989 WL 99545, at *1 (N.D. Ill.
Aug. 23, 1989)
(noting that Illinois courts have never recognized aiding and abetting breach of fiduciary duty
as cause of action).
175. See Weingarten v. Warren, 753 F. Supp. 491,496 (S.D.N.Y. 1990) (allowing aiding
and abetting breach of fiduciary duty claim against attorney because he had reaped legal fees
for twenty-eight years in representation of trustee).
176. See RESTATEMENT (SBCOND) OF TORTS § 876 cmt. d (1979) (setting out balancingtest
for substantial assistance).
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In making this determination, courts are to evaluate (1) the nature of the act

encouraged, (2) the amount of assistance given by the defendant, (3) his
presence or absence at the time of the tort, (4) his relation to the fiduciary, and
(5) the defendant's state of mind.1" In Halberstamv. Welch,"' the Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit added "duration of the assistance
provided" as a sixth factor for analysis.' 79
Relevant case law recognizes that substantial assistance need not require
actual commission of or physical participation in the tortious act.18 The
Restatement (Second)of Torts is clear in this respect, recognizing that "advice
or encouragement" to act can constitute substantial assistance in the commission of a tort.' Advice or encouragement to act provides moral support to
the tortfeasor, and courts have concluded that it may have the same effect

upon a third party's liability as participation or physical assistance.'82 For
example, the Court of Appeals in Halberstamconcluded that the defendant's
encouragement to the primary actor to carry out a burglary scheme was
sufficient to warrant liability for aiding and abetting the wrongful death of the
177. See id. (listing factors in balancing test).
178. 705 F.2d 472 (D.C. Cir. 1983).
179. See Halberstam v. Welch, 705 F.2d 472,484 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (noting that sixth factor
is necessary because length of relationship between one who actually committed crime and third
party providing assistance influences amount of aid provided). In Halberstam,the Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit addressed whether the live-in companion (defendant) of a burglar could be held jointly liable in a civil action for a murder committed in the
course of the burglary, even though she was not present at the time of the murder-burglary. Id.
at 474-75. To resolve the question, the court analyzed both conspiracy and aiding and abetting
as potential bases of liability. Id. at 476-78. The court distinguished the two theories ofjoint
liability by noting that although conspiracy analysis turned on an agreement to commit an act,
aiding and abetting liability turned on substantial assistance rather than an agreement to join the
wrongful conduct. With respect to conspiracy, the D.C. Circuit stated that circumstantial
evidence, such as the relationship between the tortfeasor and conspirator and the duration of
their activity, could give rise to an inference of an agreement. Id. at 486. With respect to aiding
and abetting liability, the court's analysis turned upon whether the assistance given rose to the
level of substantial. Id. at 488. After setting out the five factors from the Restatement (Second)
as a guide for analysis, the court added as a sixth factor the duration of the relationship between
the primary actor and the aider-and-abettor. Id. at 484,488. Although the defendant's involvement in the actual commission ofthe act in question was minimal, the length of the relationship
between the defendant and the burglar-murderer warranted a finding of substantial assistance
and participation in the scheme. Id. at 484. The Halberstam court concluded that liability was
proper under both theories offered. Id. at 489.
180. See id. at 488 (noting that substantial assistance does not require physical participation); see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 876 cmt d (1979) (stating that advice or
encouragement may constitute substantial assistance).
181. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 876 cmt. d (1979).
182. See id. (stating that advice or encouragement provides moral support to tortfeasor).
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burglary victim."8 3 Even though the cause of action in Halberstamis quite
different than the one in Granewich, the limits of substantial assistance in
Halberstamillustrate the broad range ofconduct that may constitute participation in an underlying tort.
Similarly, the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit has adopted a
rather broad definition of what actions constitute substantial assistance in the
breach of fiduciary duty. 84 The Second Circuit's definition concludes that one
participates in a fiduciary's breach of duty if he "affirmatively assists, helps
conceal, or by virtue of failing to act when required to do so enables it to
proceed." '
In Diduck, the defendant's "silence in the face of plaintiffs
inquiries" regarding the fiduciary's suspected breach of duty was sufficient
"concealment" to warrant liability for aiding and abetting.' 86 Underthe Second
Circuit's approach, the "aider and abettor" need not profit from the fiduciary's
breach.'g
The Second Circuit's broad approach to defining substantial assistance
in the breach of fiduciary duty demonstrates how courts have differentiated
liability for aiding and abetting the breach of fiduciary duty from other torts.
Although the failure to stop an imminent breach of duty or to notify the person
to whom the duty is owed generally does not amount to participation in a
tort, 8 8 courts have not adhered to that general rule when addressing liability
for aiding and abetting the breach of fiduciary duty.'89 For example, numerous courts have taken the position that one may be liable for aiding and
abetting the breach of fiduciary duty by inaction or failing to prevent the
breach, ignoring the general rule that nonfeasance does not amount to tortious
conduct.190 This distinction begins to illuminate the difficulties in applying
the elements of the cause of action to an attorney and his corporate client.' 9'
183.

See Halberstam,705 F.2d at 488 (noting that despite her absence at scene of crime,

defendant was liable as aider-and-abettor).
184. See Diduck v. Kaszycki & Sons Contractors, Inc., 974 F.2d 270,283 (2d Cir. 1992)

(defining substantial assistance).
185. Id.; see also supra notes 166-69 and accompanying text (discussing factual background and analysis of Diduck).
186. Diduck,974 F.2d at 284.

187.
188.
189.

See id.(stating that defendant need not profit from breach).

See Tuttle, supra note 29, at 928 (noting general rule regarding failure to act).
See Pietrusiak, supranote 46, at 238 (noting that numerous aiding and abetting cases
support notion that one may be held liable for inaction or failing to prevent another's breach of

duty).
190.

See id. (citing cases finding nonfeasance actionable and stating that courts ignore

traditional tort rule in this context).
191.

See id. at 243 (noting that elements of cause of action are difficult to apply in context

of corporate attorney).
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In Granewich, the defendant-attorneys' preparation of documents and
letters, provision of legal assistance, and orchestration of the squeeze-out plan
enabled the controlling shareholders to exercise actual control of the corporation."9 Arguably, assistance ofthat nature constitutes "affirmative assistance"
under Diduck's test of substantiality by enabling the breach to occur.193 Moreover, traditional understandings of causation in tort law support such a result.
Under tort law's traditional causation analysis, the proper test is whether the
plaintiff would have suffered harm '"but for" the defendant-attorneys' assistance.'94 The facts of Granewich indicate that the plaintiff would satisfy this
test. The plaintiffresisted the early attempts ofthe controlling shareholders to
remove him from the corporation,' 95 and the defendant-attorneys' efforts to
enforce those prior actions proved futile. 1' In the words ofthe Oregon Court
ofAppeals, the actions ofthe controlling shareholders prior to the involvement
of the defendant-attorneys were "invalid and ineffective."' 97 Yet once the
defendant-attorneys became involved in the attempt to squeeze-out the plaintiff, the controlling shareholders were able to amend the by-laws, to remove
plaintiff as a director, and to dilute the value of the plaintiff s stock in the
corporation. 9 ' Therefore, but for the involvement of the defendant-attorneys,
Granewich would not have suffered harm.
Thus, the wide net cast by the Second Circuit's test, whereby nearly any
degree of participation can constitute assistance in the breach of fiduciary
duty, and tort law's traditional proximate cause test support the conclusion
that imposing liability on the defendant-attorneys in Granewich is consistent
with prior legal doctrine. Yet scholarship has recognized that the "but for"
proximate cause test "represents a serious challenge to the way corporate
attorneys do business with their clients."'" Thus, despite coherence between
the result in Granewich and prior formulations of substantial assistance under
192. See Granewich v. Harding, 985 P.2d 788,791-92 (Or. 1999) (noting that defendantattorney "assisted [controlling shareholders] in exercising actual control ofthe management and
policies" of corporation).
193. See Diduck v. Kaszycki & Sons Contractors, Inc., 974 F.2d 270,283 (2d Cir. 1992)
(noting that substantial assistance may include affirmative assistance to tortfeasor).
194. See Pietrusiak, supranote 46, at 249-50 (noting "but for" causation test).
195. See Granewich, 985 P.2d at 791 (noting that plaintiff objected to controlling shareholders' actions to remove him from corporation).
196. See Granewich v. Harding, 945 P.2d 1067,1075 (Or. Ct. App. 1997) (Armstrong, J.,
dissenting) (stating that defendant-attorney realized that controlling shareholders' prior actions
were "invalid and ineffective"), rev'd, 985 P.2d 788 (Or. 1999).
197. Id.
198. See Granewich v. Harding, 985 P.2d 788, 791-92 (Or. 1999) (describing actions of
controlling shareholders with assistance from defendant-attorneys).
199. Pietrusiak, supranote 46, at 250.
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the common law, the necessity for attorney involvement in corporate squeezeouts exacerbates Granewich's implications for redefining the attorney's role
in the squeeze-out.
C. Necessityfor Attorney Involvement in Squeeze-Outs
A particularly disturbing facet of the extension of liability for aiding and
abetting the breach of fiduciary duty into the corporate squeeze-out context
stems from the necessity of attorney involvement in that type oftransaction.2"
A brief return to the facts of Granewich illustrates this dilemma." 1 The controlling shareholders in Granewich attempted to remove the plaintiff on their
own accord before hiring the defendant-attorneys. 2" They did so by removing
him from the board of directors, relieving him of his executive position, and
terminating his employment with the corporation.0 3 Only when the plaintiff
challenged the validity of those actions did the majority shareholders hire the
2 4
defendant-attorneys to assist them intheir efforts to squeeze-outthe plaintiff.
The defendant-attorneys then provided the legal expertise to effect the squeezeout by calling special meetings, amending the corporate by-laws, and issuing
stock to dilute the value of'plaintiffs interest in the corporation. 0 5
The degree of attorney involvement in the Granewich squeeze-out is
certainly not unique. Attorneys routinely facilitate corporate squeeze-outs
because the close corporation is a legal entity whose very existence derives
from attorney input and whose rules of governance and procedures are not
easily understood by lay persons." ° Moreover, by definition, a squeeze-out
200. See Granewich, 945 P.2d at 1075 (Armstrong, J., dissenting) (noting that controlling
shareholders' actions prior to attorney involvement were ineffective). The failure of the
controlling shareholders to remove Granewich on their own accord demonstrates the importance
of the defendant-attorneys' role in this transaction. Without the assistance of the defendantattorneys' involvement, the controlling shareholders were unable to accomplish their goal of
removing Granewich from the corporation.
201. See supranote 9 (commenting on Granewich);supra notes 70-107 and accompanying
text (discussing facts of Granewich).
202. See Granewich, 985 P.2d at 791 (noting that controlling shareholders devised plan
to squeeze plaintiff out of corporation).
203. See id. (noting controlling shareholders' actions).
204. See id. (noting that controlling shareholders hired defendant-attorneys after plaintiff
rejected prior efforts).
205. See id. at 791-92 (describing defendant-attorneys actions to remove plaintiff from
corporation).
206. See generalv WILLIAM M. FLETCHER, FLETCHER CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF
PRIVATE CORPORATIONS (perm. ed. 1999) (providing comprehensive discussion on nature of
corporate entity in twenty volumes); WiLAM H. PAnTER, PAINTE ON CLOSE CORPORATIONS:
CORPORATE, SECURITIES, AND TAX ASPECTS (3d ed. 1997) (providing in-depth coverage of
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involves the controlling shareholder's utilization of powers of control and
"some legal device or technique" to remove the minority shareholder from the
entity.2 7 For example, squeeze-outs often involve fundamental corporate
change, such as modification of the corporate by-laws, that can only be
accomplished by an attorney with knowledge of the statutory mechanisms
authorizing such action."° It is only natural that a majority shareholder would
turn to legal assistance when seeking to alter the corporate entity.
The necessity for attorney involvement in corporate squeeze-outs raises
concerns about holding attorneys liable for rendering professional services.
For example, one could argue that the defendant-attorneys in Granewich did
nothing more than prepare documents and conduct routine transactions at the
request oftheir client. Prior aiding and abetting litigation under federal securities laws has recognized thatholding attorneys liable for rendering professional
services poses a dilemma.2' In Schatz v. Rosenberg,21 ° the Court of Appeals
for the Fourth Circuit addressed an attorney's liability for aiding and abetting
a breach of duty under federal securities law.21 The plaintiff alleged, inter alia,
that the attorneys assisted a client's breach by drafting financial statements
corporate, securities, and taxation aspects of closely-held corporations in two volumes);
SEYMOURD. THOMPSON& JOSEPHW. THOMPSON, THOMPSON ON CORPORATIONS (Edward F.

White ed., 3d ed. 1927) (discussing application of basic corporate law principles in ten volumes). The sheer number of multi-volume treatises, cyclopedias, and collections on corporate
law and governance illustrates the complexity of the subject matter.
207. See O'NEAL& THoMPSON, supranote 3, § 1.01, at 1 (defining squeeze-out).
208. See id. § 5.01, at 3 (stating that squeeze-outs may involve fundamental corporate
change).
209. See Schatz v. Rosenberg, 943 F.2d 485, 494-95 (4th Cir. 1991) (addressing attorney
liability for "papering the deal").
210. 943 F.2d485 (4th Cir. 1991).
211.
Schatz v. Rosenberg, 943 F.2d 485, 487 (4th Cir. 1991) (noting allegations against
attorneys). In Schatz, the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit considered an attorney's
liability for fraud and aiding and abetting a violation under federal securities laws. Id. The
primary allegations against the defendant-attorneys stated that they had provided assistance by
drafting misleading financial statements for their client. Id. at 488. First, the court distinguished
the case from earlier cases involving the solicitation of securities, noting that there was no
affirmative duty upon an attorney to disclose a client's misrepresentations to a non-client. Id. at
490-92. Second, the court noted that the defendant-attorneys were not liable for merely "papering the deal" which their client had negotiated, noting that the presence of an agency relationship
does not automatically make an attorney liable for the misrepresentations of his client Id. at
494-95. Finally, the court concluded that the defendant-attorneys were not liable for aiding and
abetting their client's violation based on the fact that they had acted merely as scriveners, which
was not enough to warrant liability under the federal securities laws. Id. at 496-97. The Fourth
Circuit held that the defendant-attorneys had no duty of disclosure and that a lawyer cannot be
held liable for the representations of a client, even if the lawyer incorporates the client's misrepresentations into legal documents necessary for closing a transaction. Id. at 492, 495.

ATTORNEYLABILITY INSQUEEZE-OUTS

579

containing omissions and misrepresentations. 2 In affirming the lower court's
judgment in favor ofthe defendant-attorney, the Fourth Circuit stated:
[The "substantial assistance" element requires that alawyerbe more than
a scrivener for a client; the lawyer must actively participate in soliciting
sales or negotiating terms ofthe deal onbehalf ofa cientto have "substantialy assisted" asecuritiesviolation. Inotherwords, aplaintiffmustprove
that a defendant rendered "substantial assistance" to theprimary securities
law violation, not merely to the person committing the violation ....
While it is true that some of [the client's] documents prepared by [the
attorneys] were misleading, this fact alone does not meet the "substantial
assistance" threshold. Otherwise, there would be a per se rule holding
attorneys liable in every securities fraud case, because in virtually every
transaction, attorneys draft the closing documents. 2"
The Fourth Circuit's approach to aiding and abetting liability under federal
securities laws provides strong protection to attorneys who prepare documents
for clients that breach their legal duties and responsibilities. Arguably, such
a position would have exonerated the defendant-attorneys in Granewich.1 4
Yet there is substantial justification for Oregon's refusal to exempt the Granewich attorneys' actions from the range of conduct that constitutes substantial
assistance.
Granewich differs from Schatz in the material respect that the latter
involved alleged violations of federal securities law.2" The basis of liability
in Granewich, however, was the common-law development of liability for
aiding and abetting the breach of fiduciary duty, not interpretations of aiding
and abetting liability under federal statutes. 1 6 That material difference alone
may account for the discrepancy between the two cases regarding attorney
liability because common-law formulations of aiding and abetting liability
explicitly recognize a broader test for substantial assistance than understandings derived under federal law.217 For example, the Second Circuit noted that
the substantial assistance necessary to impose common-law liability for aiding
and abetting "is less thanthe 'substantial assistance' necessary to impose aider212. See id. at 488 (noting allegations against attorneys).
213. Id.at497.
214. See supranotes 76-80 and accompanying text (discussing attorneys' assistance).
215. See Schatz, 943 F.2d at 488 (noting allegations under federal securities laws).
216. See Granewich v.Harding, 985 P.2d 788, 792 (Or.1999)(noting reliance on Oregon
case law,rather than federal securities statutes, to resolve dispute).
217. See Diduck v.Kaszycki & Sons Contractors,Inc., 974 F.2d 270,284 (2d Cir. 1992)
(noting differences between common law and federal securities law indetermining substantial
assistance); supra notes 176-99 and accompanying text (discussing substantial assistance under
common law).

580

58 WASH. &LEE L. REV 551 (2001)

'
abettor liability under the securities laws."218
Aiding and abetting liability
under certain provisions of federal securities laws requires proof of purposeful
conduct. 219 However, the District Court for the District of Columbia concluded
in Foltz v. U.S. News & World Report, Inc. 2 that the degree of participation
required under common-law formulations of liability need not reach that level
ofpurposeful conduct." Even though Foltz did not involve allegations against
an attorney, the court stated that the defendant-appraiser's services in that case
were no differentthanthose an attorney would provide.2 22 Thus, Foltzsupports
the assumption that common-law formulations of liability for aiding and
abetting the breach of fiduciary duty do not provide the same degree ofprotection to an attorney as does liability under federal securities laws.
A recent Minnesota case regarding common-law liability for aiding and
abetting the breach offiduciary duty, however, appears to conflict with Grane-

218. Diduck, 974 F.2d at 284.
219. See Foltz v. U.S. News& World Report, Inc., 627 F. Supp. 1143,1068 (D.D.C. 1986)
(stating that aiding and abetting liability under federal securities laws requires proof of purposefilconduct).
220. 627 F. Supp. 1143 (D.D.C. 1986).
221. SeeFoltzv.U.S. News &World Report, Inc., 627 F. Supp. 1143,1068 (D.D.C. 1986)
(noting that degree of participation required under common law derived liability for aiding and
abetting breach of fiduciary duty need not reach level of purposive conduct). In Foltz, the
District Court considered, inter alia, whether American Appraisal Associates (American
Appraisal) could be held liable for aiding and abetting U.S. News & World Reports's (U.S.
News) breach of fiduciary duty under federal securities laws and ERISA. Id. at 1155. American
Appraisal was alleged to have assisted U.S. News's breach by providing assistance in the
undervaluing of U.S. News's stock. Id. at 1148. The plaintiffs alleged that the undervaluing of
the stock reduced the ERISA benefits to which they were entitled. Id. at 1147. With respect to
the claims against American Appraisal under federal securities laws, the court concluded that the
majority of the plaintiff's claims against American Appraisal were invalid because there was no
proof that American Appraisal possessed the higher level of scienter required for those actions.
Id. at 1162. The court then turned to the plaintiff's claims under ERISA. Id. at 1165. The court
analyzed those claims under common-law formulations of liability for aiding and abetting the
breach of fiduciary duty, which had been incorporated under ERISA. Id. at 1168. The court
determined that American Appraisal was not a fiduciary under ERISA. Id. at 1167. It noted,
however, that non-fiduciaries who knowingly participate in the breach may be held liable. Id.
at 1168. In response to American Appraisal's argument that it had not benefitted from the
breach, the court stated prior case law had clearly established that participation, not receipt of
profit, was the basis of liability for aiding and abetting the breach of fiduciary duty. Id. at 1168.
Moreover, the court noted, the degree of participation was less than that required under prior
cases evaluating federal securities law. Id Consequently, the degree of participation need not
reach the level of purposive conduct. Id. Accordingly, the court concluded that the plaintiff had
stated a valid cause of action for aiding and abetting the breach of fiduciary duty against
American Appraisal. Id.
222. See id. at 1166-67 (noting that defendant-appraiser's services "were certainly no different" than those of "attorneys, accountants, actuaries and consultants performing their usual
functions").
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wich's imposition of liability for rendering professional services.' In Witzman,2 24 the Minnesota court stated that "[i]n addressing aiding and abetting
liability in cases involving professionals, most courts have recognized that
'substantial assistance' means something more than the provision of routine
professional services." 225 However, the Minnesota court provided relatively
weak support for that proposition. 2 6 The Witzman court cited Schatz to support the conclusion that professionals are entitled to greater protection, yet the
applicability of Schatz to common-law formulations of aiding and abetting
liability is questionable. 27 The Minnesota court also cited Spinnerv. Nutt,'
which concluded that "an allegation that a trustee acted under the legaladvice
of the defendant, without more, is insufficient" to establish substantial assisAlthough the defendant-attorneys in Granewich did provide legal
tance.'
advice, they also drafted documents, sent letters containing misrepresentations, and provided assistance in the amendment of the by-laws to eliminate
voting requirements that protected the minority shareholder's interest in the
corporation." ° In short, they orchestrated the entire squeeze-out. Despite the
fact that drafting documents and assisting in the amendment of corporate bylaws may be commonplace in the practice of the corporate attorney, the
actions of the Granewich attorneys certainly do not fit within Spinner's limited exemption from liability for the mere provision of legal advice. 1 Conse223. See Witzman v. Lehrman, Lehrman & Flor, 601 N.W.2d 179, 188 (Minn. 1999)
(analyzing substantial assistance in aiding and abetting cases involving "professionals").
224. See supra note 148 (discussing Witzmnan in detail).
225. Witzman, 601 N.W.2d at 188.
226. See id.at 188 (supporting statement with Schatz and Spinnerv. Nutt, 631 N.E.2d 542
(Mass. 1994)).
227. See supra notes 210-18 and accompanying text (discussing Schatz's applicability to
federal securities violations).
228.
631 N.E.2d 542 (Mass. 1994).
229. Spinner v.Nutt,631 N.E.2d 542,546 (Mass. 1994) (emphasis added). InSpinner,the
court addressed, inter alia, whether an attorney could be held liable for aiding and abetting a
trustee's breach of fiduciary duty. Id. at 546. The plaintiffs alleged that the defendant-attorneys
participated in the trustee's breach of duty by advising the trustees not to sell stock held in trust.
Id. at 544. Addressing the aiding and abetting claims, the Spinnercourt concluded that the mere
allegation by the plaintiffs that the trustees acted under the legal advice of the defendantattorneys was insufficient to impose aiding and abetting liability upon the defendant-attorneys.
Id. at 546. Therefore, the court concluded that the allegations were insufficient to support a
finding that the defendant-attorneys should be held liable for aiding and abetting the trustee's
breach of fiduciary duty. Id.
230. See Granewich v. Harding, 985 P.2d 788,791-792 (Or. 1999) (describing allegations
against attorneys).
231. See supra notes 76-80 and accompanying text (discussing assistance provided by
defendant-attorneys in Granewich).
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quently, the nexus between Spinner and Granewichis strained, at best. Thus,
Granewich's imposition of liability for rendering professional services appears to be consistent with traditional notions of common-law aiding and
abetting liability.
D. Conflicts with Ethical Obligations
Under common-law formulations of substantial assistance in the breach
of fiduciary duty, "concealment" of the fiduciary's breach may be a basis for
liability.3 2 As previously noted, the Second Circuit in Diduck concluded that
the defendant's "silence in the face of the plaintiffs inquiries" about the
fiduciary's suspected breach of duty was sufficient to warrant liability for
aiding and abetting the breach of the fiduciary duty.1 3 The extreme application of that interpretation of substantial assistance would yield a result
whereby the defendant-attorneys in Granewich could be liable merely for not
explicitly informing the plaintiff of the breach of duty. Revelation of the
controlling shareholders' plan, however, would violate the obligation of confidentiality that the defendant-attorneys owe to their client. 3 4 Such a contradictory result illustrates the apparent conflict between the ethical rules governing attorney conduct and the legal liability of attorneys for aiding and abetting
the breach of fiduciary duty in a corporate squeeze-out.
Every lawyer, regardless of his particular area of specialization, is
charged with the obligation to act only for the benefit of the client and "free
of compromising influences and loyalties."235 Loyalty to the client, however,
is not absolute. For example, the obligation to refrain from assisting the client
in committing criminal or fraudulent acts tempers the attorney's duty of
loyalty to the client . 36 Additionally, an attorney may disclose information
relating to representation of a client absent consent of the client if the attorney
does so to prevent a criminal act likely to result in imminent death or substantial bodily harm. 7 For the most part, though, the "moral and legal universe"
232. See supra notes 184-87 and accompanying text (stating Second Circuit's test).
233. See supra note 186 and accompanying text (noting that silence in face of inquiry by
plaintiff constituted concealment).
234. See MODELRULES OFPROF'LCONDUCT R. 1.6 (1983) (defining nature ofconfidential
relationship between attorney and client).
235.

See MODEL CODE OF PROF'L RESPONSIBLITY EC 5-1 (1980) (stating obligations of

attorney to act solely for benefit of client).
236. See MODELRL.S OFPROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.2 (1983) (stating that lawyer should not
assist client in conduct that lawyer knows is criminal or fraudulent).
237. See id.R. 1.6 (stating that attorney may not disclose information relating to representation of client absent consent unless attorney does so to prevent imminent death or substantial
bodily harm).
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of the attorney centers on loyalty to the client."3
Save the exceptions regarding criminal acts, fraud, or substantial bodily
harm previously noted, the attorney's ethical obligations to those outside the
attorney-client relationship, or "non-clients," are relatively few." 9 In this
respect, the ethical obligations of an attorney embrace the "principle of nonaccountability.""24 Attorney liability for aiding and abetting the breach of
fiduciary duty illustrates the collision between the Model Rule's embodiment
ofthe non-accountability principle' 4 ' and tort law. For example, although the
Model Rules prohibit an attorney from participating inthe criminal or fraudulent acts of a client,242 the breach of fiduciary duty may be accomplished in
ways that are neither criminal nor fraudulent.243 Thus, tort law may impose
attorney liability for aiding and abetting the breach of fiduciary duty even
though the Model Rules do not proscribe such conduct.
Although Model Rule 1.13 addresses problems that arise when representing "organizational clients," 2 it provides little guidance for an attorney confronted with the close corporation squeeze-out. Rule 1.13 provides that an
attorney for an organizational client "shall proceed as is reasonably necessary
in the best interest ofthe organization" when a representative ofthe organization intends to act in a way that is a violation of the legal obligation of the
organization.24 The rule lists possible measures that an attorney can take in
such a situation, including asking the representative to reconsider the action or,
should that prove ineffective, disclosing the matter to higher authority within
the organization.2 46 Rule 1.13, however, permits an attorney to make disclosures only to those who can take action on the organization's behalfand forbids
disclosures to third parties who cannot do so, such as minority shareholders.247
238. See Tuttle, supra note 29, at 902 (defining "moral and legal universe" of attorney
comprised of client and non-clients).
239. See id. at 902-03 (noting that attorney has relatively few obligations to non-clients).
240. See MurrayL. Schwartz, TheProfessionalismandAccountabilityofLawyers,66CAL.
L. REV. 669, 673 (1978) (discussing "principle of non-accountability" as limiting attorney's
obligations to nonclients); Tuttle, supra note 29, at 931 (same).
241. See Tuttle, supra note 29, at 931 (noting that Model Rules are premised on nonaccountability principle).
242. SeeMoDELRuLEsOFPROF'LCONDUCTR. 1.2 (1983) (stating that lawyer should not
assist client in conduct that lawyer knows is criminal or fraudulent).
243. See Tuttle, supra note 29, at 935 (noting that Model Rule 1.2 does not cover breach
of fiduciary duty that is neither criminal nor fraudulent).
244. See MODEL RULs OF PROF'L CoNDUcT R. 1.13 (1983) (addressing problems that
arise in representation of organizational client).
245. Id.
246. See id. (recommending remedial measures).
247. See id. (stating that lawyer may disclose to "highest authority that can act on behalf
of the organization"); see also Tuttle, supra note 29, at 925 (noting that Rule 1.13 "permits dis-
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Thus, the disclosure requirement of Rule 1.13 is not applicable to the close
corporation squeeze-out. Rule 1.13 does provide that an attorney may withdraw from representation when a representative of the organization intends to
violate the legal obligations of the entity,24 but resignation of the individual
attorney involved ultimately does little to protect adequately the interests of
the minority shareholder.
The Model Rules are not devoid of any reference to an attorney's ethical
obligations to a non-client beneficiary.2 49 A comment to Rule 1.2 states that
"where the client is a fiduciary, the lawyer may be charged with special
obligations in dealing with a beneficiary.""'
Thus, the Model Rules suggest
that a corporate attorney providing assistance to a majority shareholder may
have "special obligations" to a non-chent minority shareholder. The comment
states, however, that those obligations arise when "dealing" with the beneficiary." 1 One could fashion a colorable argument that the defendant-attorneys
in Granewich were "dealing" only with their client, the controlling shareholders, and were not "dealing" with the beneficiary. Thus, the comment to Rule
1.2 provides only tenuous support for the result reached in Granewich. A
later ABA pronouncement substantially undermines that tenuous support." 2
Formal Opinion 94-380 (ABA 94-380) of the American Bar Association's Committee on Ethics and Professional Responsibility heightens the
apparent conflict between Granewich's result and the Model Rules." 3 In
addressing the applicability of the Model Rules to attorneys representing a
fiduciary in a trust or estate matter, 4 ABA 94-3 80 provides:
The fact that a fiduciary has obligations to the beneficiaries ofthe trust or
estate does not in itself either expand or limit the lawyer's obligations to
the fiduciary client under the Model Rules, nor impose on the lawyer
closure to those who can act on behalf of organization, but not to those who cannot act");
Pietrusiak, supra note 46, at 245 (stating that Rule 1.13 forbids disclosure to those who are
unable to take action on organization's behalf).
248. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCr R. 1.13 (1983) (allowing attomey to resign
from representation if disclosure to higher authority is ineffective).
249. See id. R. 1.2 cmt. (noting that lawyer may have special obligations where client is
fiduciary).
250. Id.
251. Id.
252. See ABA Comm. on Ethics and Prof'l Responsibility, Formal Op. 94-380 (1994)
(addressing applicability of Model Rules to lawyers representing fiduciary in trust or estate

matter).
253. See id. (noting that attorney representing fiduciary in estate or trust matter has no
special obligation to beneficiary).
254. See id. (addressing applicability of Model Rules to lawyers representing fiduciary in
trust or estate matter).
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obligations toward thebeneficiaries that the lawyer would not have toward
other third parties."
This language undercuts any suggestion provided in the comment to Model
Rule 1.2 that an attorney representing a fiduciary may have "special obligations" to the beneficiary in the trust situation." 6 Note, however, that ABA 94380 does not purport to interpret the Model Rules with respect to an attorney
representing a fiduciary in any other setting." 7 Therefore, a strict textual interpretation of ABA 94-380 renders it moot in assessing the ethical obligations of
an attorney representing a majority shareholder in a corporate squeeze-out.
Yet ABA 94-380 may have some predictive value in determining the
Model Rule's response to an attorney's ethical obligations to minority shareholders in a corporate squeeze-out. For example, ABA 94-380 addresses
those circumstances that arise when the lawyer represents only the fiduciary
of the trust or estate, as opposed to representing the entire trust or estate." 8
Thus, ABA 94-380 interprets the Model Rules in situations in which the
attorney has no attorney-client relationship with the beneficiary." 9 In this
regard, ABA 94-3 80 may have some value in interpreting the operation ofthe
Model Rules with respect to the defendant-attorneys in Granewich because
they represented only the controlling shareholders and did not have an
attorney-client relationship with the plaintiff-minority shareholder."c The
language of ABA 94-380, though, is incongruent with the result in Granewich
because it indicates in no uncertain terms that an attorney does not have any
special ethical obligation to the non-client beneficiary.a
The Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers does little to
resolve the conflict between the Model Rules and attorney liability in this
context. Section 73 of the Restatement (Third) provides that a lawyer may
255. Id.
256. See MODELRLF-s OFPROF'LCONDUCrR. 1.2 cmt. (1983) (noting that lawyer may
have special obligations where client is fiduciary); supra notes 249-52 and accompanying text
(discussing comment to Model Rule 1.2).
257. See ABA Comm. on Ethics and ProfP1 Responsibility, Formal Op. 94-380 (1994)
(stating that opinion addresses applicability of Model Rules to lawyers representing fiduciary
in trust or estate matter "with specific reference to whether there are exceptions to Model Rules
that apply only to lawyers practicing in this area").
258. See id.("Weaddress in this opinion the circumstances of a lawyerwho has undertaken
to represent only the fiduciary ....
").
259. See id. (stating that opinion does not address those circumstances that arise when
attorney provides joint representation to both fiduciary and beneficiary).
260. See Granewich v. Harding, 945 P.2d 1067, 1069 (Or. Ct App. 1997) (noting no
attorney-client relationship between plaintiff and defendant-attorneys), rev'd,985 P.2d 788 (Or.
1999).
261. See ABA Comm. on Ethics and Prof I Responsibility, Formal Op. 94-380 (1994)
(stating that lawyer has no special obligation to beneficiary when representing fiduciary).
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have a duty to rectify a fiduciary client's breach of duty to a beneficiary when

the attorney has assisted in the breach and the non-client is not reasonably
able to protect himself.262 One scholar has suggested that this section recog-

nizes an attorney's legal and ethical obligations towards a non-client beneficiary.2"a The comments to Section 73, however, explicitly state that the duty

contained therein does not apply when the client is a corporate officer, director, or controlling stockholder.2' Consequently, the Restatement (Third) of
the Law GoverningLawyers reinforces the conflict between attorney liability
in this context and the current understanding of an attorney's ethical obligations in a corporate squeeze-out. One result of Granewichis that tort law will

expose an attorney to legal liability without any indication that the ethical
guidelines prohibit providing assistance to a majority shareholder's breach of

fiduciary duty in a corporate squeeze-out.
V The Conflict Between Granewich and Skarbrevik v. Cohen,
England & Whitfield
The preceding Part outlined four troubling aspects of Granewich for
corporate attorneys.265 A full understanding of Granewich's implications
requires an understanding of how courts confronting similar factual situations
have resolved the question of attorney liability. Although few cases are exactly
on point, a California decision addressing an attorney's alleged conspiracy with
majority shareholders to oppress minority shareholders sharpens the under262. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TIM LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 73(4) (Preliminary
Draft No. 12, 1996) (stating attorney's duty to use care in fiduciary representation). Section
73(4) provides in pertinent part that a lawyer owes a duty to use care to a non-client when and
to the extent that
(a) the lawyers' client is a trustee, guardian, executor, lawyer or similar fiduciary
for the non-client;
(b) circumstances known to the lawyer make it clear that appropriate action by the
lawyer is necessary with respect to a matter within the scope of the representation
to prevent or rectify the breach of a fiduciary duty owed by the client to the nonclient- where: (i) the breach would be a crime or fraud; or (ii) the lawyer has
assisted or is assisting the breach;
(c) the non-client is not reasonably able to protect its rights; and
(d) such a duty would not significantly impair the performance of the lawyer's
obligations to the client.
Id.
263. See Tuttle, supra note 29, at 942 (noting that Section 73 advocates affirmative legal
duty to prevent breach).
264. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THELAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 73 cmt h (Preliminary Draft No. 12, 1996) (stating that lawyer's duty to rectify client's breach of fiduciary duty
does not apply when client is corporate officer, director, or controlling stockholder).
265. See supraPart IV (analyzing four aspects of Granewich).
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standing of Granewich's implications for redefining an attorney's role in a
corporate squeeze-out.2"
A. Skarbrevik v. Cohen, England & Whitfield
In Skarbrevik v. Cohen, England& Whiy/eld,267 the California Court of
Appeal confronted vicarious liability allegations similar to those in Granewich.e The plaintiff in Skarbrevik was a minority shareholder with a twentyfive percent interest in a closely-held corporation.269 The majority shareholders informed the plaintiff that financial circumstances dictated his removal

from the corporation. 7 After discussing the value of his shares, the plaintiff
negotiated a buy-out agreement with the majority shareholders."' The majority shareholders hired the defendant-attorney to prepare the documents to
effect the agreement.272 While waiting for those documents, the plaintiff
266. See Skarbrevik v. Cohen, England &Whitfield, 282 Cal. Rptr. 627 (Ct. App. 1991)
(addressing liability of corporate attorney for conspiring with majority shareholders to defraud
minority shareholder).
267. 282 Cal. Rptr. 627 (Ct.App. 1991).
268. Skarbrevik v. Cohen, England & Whitfield, 282 Cal. Rptr. 627 (Ct. App. 1991). In
Skarbrevik, the California Court of Appeal addressed the liability of a corporate attorney for
conspiring with majority shareholders to defraud the minority shareholder. Id. at 629. After
breaching a buy-out agreement with the minority shareholder, the majority shareholders hired
corporate counsel to assist them in diluting the minority shareholder's interest in the corporation. Id. at 630-31. The defendant-attomey prepared and filed with the Secretary of State
documents memorializing a shareholders' meeting at which the shareholders amended the
corporate by-laws to delete the preemptive rights provision. Id.at 632. The defendant-attorney
knew, however, that no such meeting had occurred and that the plaintiff was unaware of the
proposal to amend the by-laws. Id. After rejecting a professional negligence claim against the
attorney due to the absence of any legal duty between the attorney and the minority shareholder,
the California court addressed conspiracy charges against the attorney. Id. at 636-37. Relying
on Doctors' Co. v. Superior Court,775 P.2d 508 (Cal. 1989), the court stated that a cause of
action for civil conspiracy may not arise if the alleged conspirator was not personally bound by
•the duty violated and was acting only as the agent or employee of the party who did have that
duty. Id. at 638. Moreover, a nonfiduciary attorney is liable for conspiracy in the breach of
fiduciary duty only if the attorney acts in furtherance of his own financial gain. Id. at 638-39.
Noting that the defendant-attorney received only "modest" compensation, the Skarbrevikcourt
concluded that the defendant-attorney could not be held liable for conspiracy to breach the
fiduciary's duties. Id. at 640. The court held that the plaintiff's causes of action for negligence
and conspiracy were barred. Id. at 629.
269. See id. (noting that Skarbrevik was officer, director, employee, and twenty-five percent shareholder in closely-held corporation).
270. See id. at 630 (stating that majority shareholder advised plaintiff that "they could not
afford to keep [him] on the books").
271. See id. (stating that plaintiff negotiated buy-out agreement whereby he would receive
$4,500 per month for ten years in return for his shares).
272. See id. (stating that majority shareholder hired defendant-attorney to prepare documents to effect buy-out).
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resigned from his director and officer positions and terminated his employment with the corporationY 3 Although the defendant-attorney prepared the
necessary documents and forwarded them to the majority shareholders, the
majority shareholders informed the plaintiff that they were refusing to honor
their prior agreement with himY 4 Apparently, the plaintiff took no further
action to enforce the agreement at that time.
Approximately four months later, the majority shareholders sought the
defendant-attorney's assistance in the issuance of additional shares of stock
to themselves." The majority shareholders told the defendant-attorney that
the issuance of such stock was necessary to compensate them for their "financial sacrifices" in preserving the financially-troubled corporation. 6 The
defendant-attorney, however, knew that the majority
shareholders' purpose
277
was to dilute the plaintiff's interest in the entity.
The defendant-attorney informed the majority shareholders that the
preemptive rights provision of the corporation's by-laws required that they
offer twenty-five percent of the new shares to the plaintiff." Consequently,
the defendant-attorney advised the majority shareholders to hold a special
shareholders' meeting at which the preemptive rights provision would be
deleted. 279 He further advised the majority shareholders to notify the plaintiff
at least ten days prior to the meeting.2"' Moreover, the defendant-attorney
informed the majority shareholders that any amendment had to be in pursuit
of a legitimate corporate purpose and rendered his opinion that the financial
concerns of the majority shareholders constituted such a valid purpose."s
The majority shareholders, however, did not convene a special shareholders' meeting and, consequently, they did not amend the corporate by-laws to
273. See id. (stating that plaintiff resigned at request of majority shareholders while
awaiting necessary documents).
274. See id. at 630-31 (noting that majority shareholders had decided not to pay plaintiff).
275. See id. at 631 (stating that majority shareholders contacted defendant-attomey four
months later to inquire about issuance of additional shares of stock).
276. See id. (stating that corporation was experiencing financial difficulties and that
majority shareholders had personally secured corporate loans and reduced their salaries to save

corporation).
277.

See id. (quoting letter from defendant-attorney to majority shareholders regarding plan

to issue more stock).
278. See id. (noting communications between defendant-attorney and majority shareholder).
279. See id. (stating that defendant-attorney advised majority shareholders to amend corporate by-laws at special shareholders' meeting).
280. See id.(noting that defendant-attorney advised majority shareholders that plaintiff had
right to be notified at least ten days prior to meeting).
281. See id. (stating that defendant-attomey advised majority shareholders that proposed
amendment was in pursuit of proper corporate purpose).
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On March 8, approximately three
permit the issuance of additional stock.'
months later, the defendant-attorney informed the majority shareholders by
letter that they could amend the by-laws at the annual shareholders' meeting
in lieu of a special shareholders' meeting."s Yet there was one significant
obstacle to this solution: The defendant-attorney knew that the by-laws required the annual meeting to occur by March 1, seven days prior to the date of
his letter to the majority shareholders.284 The defendant-attorney, however,
attached to the letter a set of papers memorializing the annual shareholders'
meeting that never occurred and the action supposedly taken to delete the
preemptive rights provision of the by-aws.1s Despite knowledge that the
annual meeting had not occurred and that the majority shareholders had not
informed the plaintiff of any proposal to amend the by-laws, the defendantattorney perfected the amendment by filing the requisite documents with the
Secretary of State and the Department of Corporations.s Within nine months,
the majority shareholders issued to themselves 500 additional shares of stock
each, thereby diluting the plaintiff's interest in the corporation from twentyfive percent to less than five percent without his knowledge.'
The plaintiff learned of the dilution of his stock when he filed an action
against the majority shareholders for breach of the buy-out agreement." He
subsequently amended his complaint to include allegations of breach of fiduciary duty." 9 The amendment also named the defendant-attorney and his firm,
alleging counts of professional negligence and conspiracy to defraud. 2" The
plaintiff settled with the majority shareholders prior to trial, and the action
against the defendant-attorney proceeded. 1
The trial court returned a general verdict against the defehdant-attorney,
coupled with special findings that he had conspired to commit fraud against
the plaintiff. 9 On appeal, the California Court of Appeal initially addressed
282. See id. at 632 (noting that meeting never took place).
283. See id. (noting that defendant-attomey wrote majority shareholders on March 8, 1994,
to inform them that they could amend by-laws at annual meeting).
284. See id. (noting that meeting was to occur by March 1).
285. See id. (stating that defendant-attorney "attached a new set of papers memorializing
the 'meeting' and action supposedly taken to delete the preemptive rights provision").
286. See id. (stating that defendant-attorney perfected amendment to by-laws by filing it).
287. See id. (noting that, as result of five corporate resolutions each authorizing issuance
of 100 shares to each majority shareholder, plaintiff's stock was diluted to 4.7 percent without
his knowledge).
288. See id. (stating that plaintiff learned of dilution when he filed action against majority
shareholders).
289. See id. at 629 (noting procedural posture).
290. See id. (noting procedural posture).
291. See id. (noting procedural posture).
292. See id. at 629-30 (noting trial court findings).

58 WASH. &LEE L. REV 551 (2001)
whether the defendant-attorney had breached a primary duty to the plaintiff. 3
Because the plaintiff was not the intended beneficiary of the defendant-attorney's actions, the court refused to find the existence
of a primary duty of care
294
between the defendant-attorney and the plaintiff.
In addressing the conspiracy claim, the court of appeal initially noted
that the majority shareholders committed a tort against the plaintiff by concealing their breach of fiduciary duties from him.' The court then noted that
the record contained evidence from which a jury could infer that the defendant-attorney "knowingly participated" in the majority shareholders' fraud. 6
Had Skarbrevik involved allegations of aiding and abetting the breach of
fiduciary duty, the above conclusions of the court would have been sufficient
to support a finding that the plaintiff had successfully proved the elements of
that cause of action.297 Even so, the California court concluded that the
defendant-attorney could not be held liable "[a]bsent either an individual duty
to the plaintiff or a personal financial interest in the matter."' Recall that
the court had determined earlier that the defendant-attorney did not owe an
individual duty to the plaintiff.'
And although the defendant-attorney
received "modest compensation" for services to the majority shareholders, the
court concluded that the receipt of legal fees in this circumstance did not
constitute a personal financial interest in the matter.3" Thus, the California
Court of Appeal reversed the lower court's finding for the plaintiff on the
grounds that the defendant-attorney neither violated a primary duty to the
plaintiff nor assisted the majority shareholders in furtherance of his own
financial gain.3 '

293.

See id. at 632 (addressing whether defendant-attorney breached primary duty to plain-

timf.
294. See id. at 637 (concluding that plaintiff was not intended beneficiary of defendantattorney's actions and that no primary duty existed between them).
295. See id. (stating that majority shareholders committed tort of fraudulent concealment).
296. Id.
297. See supra notes 51-55 and accompanying text (discussing three elements of aiding
and abetting breach of fiduciary duty).
298. Skarbrevik v. England, Cohen & Whitfield, 282 Cal. Rptr. 627, 640 (Ct. App.
1991).
299. See supra notes 293-94 and accompanying text (stating that Skarbrevik court determined that defendant-attorney did not owe individual duty to plaintiff).
300. See Skarbrevik, 282 Cal. Rptr. at 639 (noting that defendant-attomey received only
modest compensation).
301. See id. at 640 (reversing on grounds that defendant-attomey did not violate primary
duty and did not act in furtherance of own financial interest).
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B. Resolving Differences in Outcome
The factual similarities between Granewich and Skarbrevik are quite
striking. 2 Majority shareholders in each case terminated the minority's
employment, removed the minority from the board of directors, clandestinely
amended the corporate by-laws, and issued stock to themselves to dilute the
minority's interest." 3 In both cases, the defendant-attorneys played a vital
role in the squeeze-out process by providing legal expertise and by orchestrating the process to reduce the minority shareholder's interest in the corporation. °4 Curiously, the outcomes are diametrically opposed. 05 Yet, were we
to weigh the actions of each defendant-attorney, one could argue that the
attorney in Skarbrevik committed the more egregious action by fabricating and
filing documents for a fictitious meeting and phony amendment to the corporate by-laws. 3" One might mistakenly believe that the difference in outcomes
is based on different causes of action."° Instead, the difference in outcomes
rests on a fundamental disagreement over an attorney's ethical obligations to
non-clients in a squeeze-out. Skarbrevik'slimitations on attorney liability rest
upon the "principle of non-accountability," 0 8 a conceptualization of an attorney's ethical obligations that conflicts with Granewich'sextension of liability.
In order to properly frame the inapplicability of the principle of non-accountability in the squeeze-out context, one must view Skarbrevikin light of California's prior case law regarding attorney liability.
1. HistoricalFoundationsof Skarbrevik
Although traditional norms of lawyer accountability were based on the
privity concept, which embraced the belief that a lawyer could never owe a
302. Compare supranotes 70-107 and accompanying text (discussing facts of Granewich),
with supra notes 267-301 and accompanying text (discussing facts of Skarbrevik).
303. Compare supra notes 73-80 and accompanying text (describing squeeze-out techniques in Granewich), with supra notes 270-87 and accompanying text (describing squeeze-out
techniques in Skarbrevik).
304. Compare supra notes 75-80 and accompanying text (noting defendant-attorneys' role
in Granewich), with supra notes 272-87 and accompanying text (noting defendant-attorney's
role in Skarbrevik).
305. Compare supra notes 106-07 and accompanying text (discussing resolution of Cranewich), with supra notes 296-301 and accompanying text (discussing resolution of Skarbrevik).
306. See supra notes 283-86 and accompanying text (noting that defendant-attorney in
Skarbrevik filed fabricated documents with state).
307. Compare supra notes 83-85 and accompanying text (noting plaintiff in Granewich
alleged aiding and abetting breach of fiduciary duty), with supra note 290 and accompanying
text (noting plaintiff in Skarbrevik alleged conspiracy).
308. See Tuttle, supra note 29, at 932 (noting that Skarbrevik extends non-accountability
principle to fiduciary representation).
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duty to a non-client" ° California courts led the way in extending a lawyer's
duty to non-clients"'0 by abandoning the privity requirement with respect to
attorneys in 1961.311 In Lucas v. Hamm, 12 a California court addressed the
issue of attorney liability to non-clients for the negligent drafting of a will.31
Even though prior California cases confronting the identical issue had turned
on the question of privity, 14 the Lucas court noted that the issue ofprivity had
'
been greatly "liberalized." 15
In abandoning the privity requirement,316 the
court concluded that the issue of liability involved a matter of policy and
should turn on a balancing test specific to each case.1
By 1976, however, the California courts retreated from the broad balancing test adopted in Lucas to a test centered more on foreseeability of harm.1 8
The justification for doing so was based on the policy argument that broadbased attorney liability to third parties with whom the client deals at arm's
309. See David Hricik,AttorneyLiability to Non-Clients: IsPFrivity theIssue?, PROF. LAW.,
Spring 1998, at 1, 1 (noting that privity rule holds attorney can never owe duty to non-client).
310. See Nancy J. Moore, ExpandingDuties of Attorneys to "Non-Clients": Reconceptualizing the Attorney-ClientRelationshipin Entity Representationand Other InherentlyAmbiguousSituations,45 S.C. L. REV. 659, 661 (1994) (describing California as "jurisdiction that
led the way in extending a lawyer's duty to non-clients").
311. See Lucas v. Harmm, 364 P.2d 685, 688 (Cal. 1961) (stating that lack of privity
between plaintiffs and defendant-attorney does not preclude plaintiffs from maintaining action
in tort against defendant-attorneys).
312. 364 P.2d 685 (Cal. 1961).
313. See Lucas v. Harm, 364 P.2d 685, 686 (Cal. 1961) (stating that beneficiaries of will
brought action against defendant-attorneys alleging negligent drafting of will). In Lucas, the
California Supreme Court addressed the issue of whether an attorney could be liable to nonclient beneficiaries of a will that he had drafted. Id. Relying on earlier precedent abandoning
the privity requirement with respect to notary publics, the California court determined that lack
of privity would not shield the defendant-attorney from liability for a tort Id. at 688. The court
determined that liability should instead turn on a balancing test. Id. at 687. The court addressed
the following factors: the extent to which the transaction was intended to affect the plaintiff,
the foreseeability of harm to him, the degree of certainty that the plaintiff suffered injury, the
closeness of the connection between the defendant's conduct and the injury, and the policy of
preventing future harm. Id. The court also assessed whether imposing liability on the attorney
would cause undue burden on the legal profession. Id. at 688. The court resolved the balancing
test in favor of the plaintiff. Id. Despite that conclusion, however, the court determined that
the defendant-attorneys were not negligent. Id. at 691-92.
314. See id. at 687 (noting that earlier cases had turned on privity).
315. Id.
316. See id. at 688 (noting that plaintiffs could state claim in tort despite lack of privity).
317. See id. at 687 (stating that whether defendant-attorney should be held liable to nonclient is matter of policy involving balancing of factors).
318. See id. at 662 & n.21 (noting that California retreated from balancing test in legal
malpractice actions by 1976).
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length would threaten the attorney's counseling role, resulting in both an
undue burden on the profession and a reduction in the quality of legal services. 19 Despite that realization, however, California again opened the door
to attorney liability seven years later in WolWch Corp. v. UnitedStates Auto-

mobile Ass 'n. 2°
Wol66ch addressed attorney liabilityto a non-client for assisting an insurance company in the non-payment of a claim made by a policy holder. 2'
Although the Wolfich court emphasized that attorneys should not be held
liable for rendering legal advice,5 ' z the court stated that "[a]ttoreys may be
liable for participationin tortious acts with their clients, and such liability
may rest on a conspiracy."'31 With respect to attorney liability for participation in a client's tortious conduct, WolWch bears a strong resemblance to
Granewich.3 24 Had the holding of Wo~lich remained good law, perhaps the
result in Skarbrevikwould have squared with Granewich.
Following the Wofich decision, however, the number of conspiracy

claims filed against attorneys proliferated in California.31 Plaintiffs filed so

many claims, in fhct, that the California legislature enacted Section 1714.10326
319. See id. at 662 (arguing that liability to non-clients would threaten professional relationship).
320. Wolfrich Corp. v. United States Auto. Assoc., 197 Cal. Rptr. 446 (Ct. App. 1983).
In Wolfrich, the California court addressed whether an attorney could be held liable to a nonclient for conspiracy with a client to violate the insurance code. Id. at 447. The attorneys were
alleged to have assisted an insurance company by failing to make a good faith attempt to effect
a prompt settlement of an insurance claim and by filing a frivolous lawsuit to avoid payment of
the claim. Id. at 447-48. The court considered whether the relationship among the parties
insulated the attorneys from liability. Id. at 448. Noting that there was a line of authority for
granting immunity to attorneys for assisting clients in the commission of a tort, the Wofrch
court concluded that "[a]ttomeys may be liable for participation in tortious acts with their
clients, and such liability may rest on a conspiracy." Id. at 449. The court was careful, however, to note that attorneys should not be liable for advising their clients but that participation
in tortious activity may subject attorneys to liability. Id. The court concluded that the plaintiffs
had alleged the necessary facts to sustain a cause of action of conspiracy against the attorneys.
Id. at 450.
321. See id. at 447 (noting that defendant-attorneys assisted insurance company in ignoring
claim).
322. See id. at 449 (noting that attorneys must be free to fully advise their clients).
323. Id. (emphasis added).
324. See Granewich v. Harding, 985 P.2d 788, 793-94 (Or. 1999) (concluding that attorney
can be liable for participating in client's tortious conduct).
325. See l. Randolph Evans & Ida P. Dorvee, Attorney LiabilityforAssistingClientswith
Wrongful Conduct: Establishedand EmergingBases of Liability,45 S.C. L. REV. 803, 812
(1994) (stating that claims against attorneys by non-clients proliferated following Wojfrich).
326. See CAL. CIV. CODE § 1714.10 (West 1998) (abolishing conspiracy cause of action
against attorney by non-client absent certain circumstances).
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to curtail litigation by non-clients. 3 27 As originally enacted, Section 1714.10
prevented non-clients from filing conspiracy claims against attorneys absent
a finding and an order by the court that the plaintiff had a reasonable probability of prevailing in the action against the attorney.s
One year after the legislature passed Section 1714.10, the California
courts again faced a conspiracy claim against an attorney by a non-client in
Doctors 'Co. v. Superior Court."9 Rather than relying on Section 1714.10 to
dispose of the plaintiffs claim against the attorneys, however, the California
Supreme Court stated that the applicable rule of law precluded liability when
the attorney "was not personally bound by the duty violated by the wrongdoing and was acting only as the agent or employee of the of the party who did
327. See Evans & Dorvee,supra note 325, at 812 (noting that California legislature passed
statute in response to proliferation of claims against attorneys by non-clients).
328. See CAL. Civ. CODE § 1714.10 (West 1998) (stating that court must issue order
allowing conspiracy claim against attorney in order for plaintiff to include cause of action in
complaint). Section 1714.10 provides in relevant part:
No cause of action against an attorney for civil conspiracy with his or her client
arising from any attempt to contest or compromise a claim or dispute, and which
is based upon the attorney's representation of the client, shall be included in a
complaint or other pleading unless the court enters an order allowing the pleading
that includes the claim for civil conspiracy to be filed after the court determines that
the party seeking to file the pleading has established that there is a reasonable
probability that the party will prevail in the action.
Id.
329. See Doctors' Co. v. Super. Ct., 775 P.2d 508, 509 (Cal. 1989) (stating issue ofwhether
attorney could be liable to non-client for conspiracy to assist insurance company in failing to
settle claim when liability was clear). In Doctors' Co., the Supreme Court of California addressed an attorney's liability for allegedly entering into a conspiracy with an insurance company
to refrain from attempting a fair claim settlement in violation of the California Insurance Code.
Id. at 509. The court began its analysis of the conspiracy claim against the defendant-attorneys
by noting that they were not bound by the Insurance Code. Id. at 510. Rather, the defendantattorneys' client was bound by the duty. Id. The court stated that the applicable rule of law held
that a cause of action for civil conspiracy may not arise if the alleged conspirator was not
personally bound by the duty violated and was acting only as the agent of the party who did have
that duty. Id. at 511. Because the duty involved in this case was "peculiar" to the insurance
company, the defendant-attorneys could not be liable for conspiring to violate it Id. at 512. The
court criticized Wolfr'ch for misconstruing the applicable rule of law. Id. at 511. The court
noted that attorney liability for conspiracy with a client could arise in two circumstances. Id. at
512. First, an attorney may be liable for civil conspiracy to violate a duty peculiar to the client
when the attorney acts not only in the performance of a professional duty to serve the client "but
also in furtherance of the attorney's own financial gain." Id. at 513. Second, an attorney may
be liable for civil conspiracy with a client "by violating the attorney's own duty to the plaintiff."
Id. The Doctors' Co. court concluded that the plaintiff failed to state a cause of action because
the defendant-attorneys "acted solely as the [client's] agents and did not personally share the
statutory duty alleged to have been violated." Id. at 514.
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have the duty."33 Even though the attorneys may have assisted their client's
violation of duty, such conduct could not give rise to liability because the
defendant-attorneys were not personally bound by the duty.33 The court
recognized two situations in which an attorney could be liable for conspiracy
to violate a client's duty.332 First, an attorney may be liable for conspiring to
assist a client in a violation of duty peculiar to the client if the attorney was
acting "in furtherance of the attorney's own financial gain."33 Thus, an
attorney who wrongly acts for his individual advantage and not solely on
behalf of the principal may be liable to a non-client. 34 Second, an attorney
may be liable for conspiring with his client to violate the attorney's own duty
to the plaintiff3 35 The California Supreme Court dismissed the complaint
against the defendant-attorneys because they had "acted solely as the [client's]
agents and6did not personally share the statutory duty alleged to have been
33
violated.
By the time that Skarbrevikreached the California Court of Appeal, the
California Supreme Court had adopted Doctors' Co. as the new standard for
attorney liability.33 7 Thus, the interpretation of attorney liability from Doctors' Co. controlled the determination of liability in Skarbrevik.31 When
viewed in the context of California's experience with attorney liability, the
result in Skarbrevikreveals that policy arguments against attorney liability and
concerns
of judicial economy apparently influenced the disposition of the
9
33

case.

330. Id. at511.
331. See Evans & Dorvee, supra note 325, at 813 (analyzing Doctors' Co. and stating that
attorneys could not be liable because duty was peculiar to client).
332. See Doctors' Co., 775 P.2d at 512 ("It remains true, of course, that under other sets
of circumstances '[a]ttomeys may be liable for participation in tortious acts with their clients,
and such liability may rest on a conspiracy."' (quoting Wolfrich Corp. v. United States Auto.
Assoc., 197 Cal. Rptr. 446,449 (Ct. App. 1983))).
333. Id.
334. See id. at 513 (stating that attorney may be liable to non-client when acting for own
individual advantage and not solely on behalf ofprincipal).
335. See id. ("Also to be distinguished from the present case are claims against an attorney
for conspiring with his or her client to cause injury by violating the attorney's own duty to the
plaintiff.").
336. Id. at 514.
337. See Skarbrevik v. Cohen, England & Whitfield, 282 Cal. Rptr. 627, 638 (Ct. App.
1991) (noting that supreme court handed down Doctors' Co. decision after trial of Skarbrevik
but before case reached court of appeal).
338. See id. at 640 (applying test formulated in Doctors' Co.).
339. See infra notes 340-49 and accompanying text (revealing that policy arguments influenced decision in Skarbrevik).
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2 Skarbrevik and the "PrincipleofNon-Accountability"

As mentioned above, Skarbrevik's limitations on attorney liability to a
non-client beneficiary represent an extension of the concept that scholars have
referred to as the "principle of non-accountability."3' 4 ' The principle of nonaccountability morally and legally distances the lawyer from the client's
project when the lawyer is acting in a professional capacity.341 It allows the
lawyer to perform acts for a client that would normally be morally, and
perhaps even legally, wrong for non-lawyers to perform. 42 As Skarbrevik
illustrates, as long as the attorney acts to further the client's interest, as
opposed to acting for personal motive or profit, the non-accountability principle shields him from liability.343
Attorney non-accountability, as embraced in Skarbrevik, suffers fatal
doctrinal flaws that undermine its applicability in the corporate squeeze-out
context. 344 Recall that the Skarbrevik court precluded the beneficiaries from
asserting claims against the defendant-attorneys because the defendant-attorneys were acting merely as agents of the principal.345 That result, however,
clearly contradicts the substantive law of agency.3 46 Section 343 of the
Restatement (Second)ofAgency provides, in pertinent part, that "[a]n agent
who does an act otherwise a tort is not relieved from liability by the fact that
347
he acted at the command of the principal or on account of the principal.1
Thus, agency status does not limit the liability of an agent who assists the
violation of a duty peculiar to the principal. 4 8 Applying agency principles to
the fiduciary context, Section 343 indicates that the mere fact that the agent
340. See supra note 308 and accompanying text (noting that Skarbrevik extends principle
of non-accountability to fiduciary representation).
341. See Tuttle, supra note 29, at 931 (defining non-accountability principle).
342. See id. at 932 (stating that non-accountability principle shields attorneys from moral
and legal blame when acting for client).
343. See Skarbrevik v. Cohen, England & Whitfield, 282 Cal. Rptr. 627, 640 (Ct. App.
1991) (noting that attorney is not liable absent individual duty or personal financial interest);
Tuttle, supra note 29, at 932 ("Provided that the attorney acts for her client, she is not charged
with the moral or, in most cases, the legal quality ofher act.").
344. See Tuttle, supra note 29, at 932 (noting that non-accountability principle suffers from
legal flaw).
345. See Skarbrevik, i82 Cal. Rptr. at 639 (stating that courts may not impose liability on
attorneys who act merely as agents).
346. See REsTATEmENT (SEcoND) oFAGENcy § 343 (1957) (providing liability for agents);
Tuttle, supra note 29, at 933 (noting that non-accountability contradicts agency law).
347. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) oFAGENCY § 343 (1957).
348. See Tuttle, supra note 29, at 933 (stating that agency status does not shield agent from
liability).
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acted on behalf of the fiduciary does not shield the agent from liability.3 ' It
is clear, then, that the result in Granewich is remarkably consistent with the
substantive law of agency, while the result in Skarbrevikcontradicts that law
to create an exemption solely for attorneys. Given Granewich's consistency
with legal doctrine, the difference in outcome between Granewich and
Skarbrevikmust rest on policy arguments regarding attorney liability.
3. Evaluation ofPolicy Arguments
In retreating from increased attorney liability to non-clients, the California Supreme Court expressed concern that broad-based liability would result
in a diminution in the quality of legal services and would inject "self protective reservations" into the attorney-client relationship. 35 0 The Oregon Court
of Appeals cataloged additional arguments against the imposition of attorney
liability for aiding a client's breach of fiduciary duty in a corporate squeezeout.3 1 In evaluating those arguments, the Oregon Court of Appeals stated:
[I]t could be argued that to impose liability on attorneys for giving legal
advice and acting onbehalf oftheir clients inthe context of the facts ofthis
case will undermine the attorney-clientrelationship aswell as otherprofessional relationships where highly specialized advice or services are rendered.... The giving ofprofessional advice willbe "chilled" bytheknowledgethatliabilitycould resultto those outside theprofessionalrelationship.
The litigation ofthe knowledge element of Section 876(b) [oftheRestatement (Second)of Torts] may require clients and their attorneys to disclose
confidential communications in defense of claims made against them. 2
These arguments apparently influenced the court of appeals's refusal to hold
the defendant-attorneys liable for aiding and abetting the controlling shareholders' breach of fiduciary duty. 3
The arguments supporting the decision of the Oregon Court of Appeals
do seem persuasive. The threat of chilling the delivery of professional advice
and services by exposing the attorney and confidential communications to
potential disclosure requirements is more than enough to strike fear in the
hearts of corporate attorneys and corporate clients. A common-law exception
to the attorney-client relationship, however, substantially undermines the
349. See id. (applying Section 343 to fiduciary context).
350. Goodman v. Kennedy, 556 P.2d 737,743 (Cal. 1976).
351. See Granewich v. Harding, 945 P.2d 1067, 1074 (Or. CtL App. 1997) (discussing
policy concerns at length), rev'd, 985 P.2d 788 (Or. 1999).
352. Id.
353. See id. at 1074 (noting that policy concerns are "part of the equation" and that case

has implications for anyone who assists in conduct that breaches duty owed by another).
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strength of these policy arguments offered by the California Supreme Court
and Oregon Court ofAppeals." 4
The common law has long recognized a fiduciary exception to the
attomey-client privilege.35 Arising initially from the common law of trusts,
the fiduciary exception expanded into shareholder litigation around 1970."6
In Section 134A, the Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers
addresses the fiduciary exception, explaining that "[i]n a proceeding in which
a.. . fiduciary is charged with breach of fiduciary duties by a beneficiary, the
tribunal may direct that a communication otherwise within [the attorney-client
3 7 Moreover, Section
privilege] is nonetheless not privileged.""
134B of the
Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers provides for a similar
fiduciary exception to the attorney-client privilege in a dispute between an
organizational client and its shareholders if the tribunal finds that those
managing the organization are charged with breach oftheir obligations toward
the shareholders. 5 ' Even though the Restatement (Third) sections do not
specifically address the applicability of the fiduciary exception in the close
corporation context, the District Court of Delaware has held that the attorneyclient privilege does not protect communications between a controlling
shareholder and his attorney from discovery in a breach of fiduciary duty
action brought by minority shareholders. 59 In so holding, the District Court
noted that "where the fiduciary represents conflicting interests, particularly
where one of those interests is its own, the only purpose to be served by the
use of the [attorney-client] privilege to withhold information from those to
3
whom the fiduciary obligation runs is fraud. ''""
354. See Valente v. PepsiCo, Inc., 68 F.R.D. 361, 369 (D. Del. 1975) (holding that
attorney-privilege did not protect documents relating to majority shareholder's breach of fiduciary duty from discovery in action by minority shareholders); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE
LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 134A (Preliminary Draft No. 11, 1995) (stating exception to
attorney-client privilege in fiduciary-lawyer communication).
355. See Craig C. Martin & Matthew H. Metcalf, The FiduciaryExceptionto theAttorneyClient Privilege, 34 TORT & INS. L.J. 827, 828 (1999) (noting that fiduciary exception to

attorney-client privilege is common-law exception).
356. See Garner v. Wolfinbarger, 430 F.2d 1093,1099 (5th Cir. 1970) (extending fiduciary
exception to attorney-client privilege in shareholder litigation); Martin & Metcalf, supra note
355, at 828 (tracing development of fiduciary exception).
357.

RESTATEMENT(THRD)OFTELAWGOVERNNGLAwYERS

§ 134A (PreliminaryDraft

No. 11,1995).
358. See id. § 134B (providing organizational fiduciary exception to attomey-client
privilege).
359. See Valente, 68 F.R.D. at 369 (holding that attorney-client privilege does not protect
documents).
360. Id.at369n.16.
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The existence of the fiduciary exception to the attorney-client privilege
renders moot the policy arguments of the Oregon Court of Appeals against-the
imposition of attorney liability for aiding and abetting the breach of fiduciary
duty.36 1 The fiduciary exception undermines the confidentiality of any fiduciary-attorney relationship because documents relating to the fiduciary's breach
of duty may be discoverable in an action by the beneficiary.362 That threat has
existed in shareholder litigation for at least thirty years. 63 It is certainly
plausible that attorney liability for aiding and abetting the breach of fiduciary
duty will not chill fiduciary-attorney communications anymore so than the
fiduciary exception to the attorney-client privilege.
California's previous experiences with attorney liability provide another
argument against the extension of attorney liability into this context. 36" Recall
that plaintiffs flooded the California courts with claims against attorneys after
both Lucas and Wotfch.36 s The historical notes to Section 1714.10 explicitly
indicate that California passed the statute in response to Wo ich.3 Thus, an
additional argument against the imposition of attorney liability for aiding a
fiduciary's breach of duty in the corporate squeeze-out may be one ofjudicial
economy - that the courts simply could not handle the case load resulting
from such increased attorney liability to non-clients. As a predicate to any
action against an attorney for aiding and abetting, though, the fiduciary must
have breached the primary duty to the plaintiff.3" Thus, the minority shareholder already has a cause of action against the fiduciary. Any claim against
an attorney for aiding and abetting simply could be consolidated with the
claim against the fiduciary, thereby reducing the case load of the court.
Admittedly, the extension of liability for aiding and abetting the breach
of fiduciary duty into the corporate squeeze-out context places the attorney in
a precarious position. Under a scheme that imposes attorney liability for
361.
See supra note 352 and accompanying text (quoting policy arguments of Oregon
Court ofAppeals).
362. See Valente v. PepsiCo, Inc., 68 F.R.D. 361,369 (D. Del. 1975) (holding documents
discoverable); RESTATEMENT (TMD) OF T E LAW GOVERNINGLAWYERS § 134A (Preliminary
Draft No. 11,1995) (noting that documents may be discoverable).
363. See Martin & Metcalf, supra note 355, at 828 (noting extension of fiduciary exception
to shareholder litigation in 1970).
364. See supra notes 310-39 and accompanying text (discussing California's experience
with attorney liability to non-clients).
365. See supranote 325 and accompanying text (noting that claims by non-clients against
attorneys rose sharply).
366. See supra notes 326-27 and accompanying text (noting that legislature acted in
response to Wof ch).
367. See supra notes 40.46 and accompanying text (discussing primary and third-party
liability for aiding and abetting breach offiduciary duty).
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aiding a fiduciary's breach of duty, an attorney likely will avoid those actions
that clearly violate the beneficiary's legal rights. Yet given the "underlying
vagueness" which masks fiduciary jurisprudence, 3" coupled with a permissi36 9
ble modicum of self-interest in the close corporation fiduciary relationship,
it is not always clear, absent a ruling from a court, whether a particular course
of action is either legitimate or in breach of the fiduciary's obligations. It is
probable, then, that attorneys will act more cautiously whenever minority
shareholders' rights are at stake. But an attorney who acts more cautiously
with respect to a minority shareholder's rights may expose himself to liability
for failing to aggressively represent the interest of his client, the majority
shareholder.Y Thus, attorney liability for aiding and abetting the breach of
fiduciary duty in a corporate squeeze-out has the potential for placing the
attorney in a "double bind." As a result, an attorney may face aiding and
abetting liability to a non-client for overly aggressive representation of his
client's interests, yet the attorney may face malpractice liability or ethical
sanctions for overly cautious representation of the client's interests.
V. Redefining the Attorney's Obligationsin the Squeeze-Out
Analysis of case law reveals that Granewich is remarkably consistent
with the substantive law of torts 371 and agency372 in holding an attorney liable
for assisting a client in a breach of fiduciary duty. Although aiding and abetting liability in this context justly should raise concern in the legal profession,
the common law's recognition of the fiduciary exception to the attorney-client
privilege substantially weakens one of the strongest policy arguments against
such liability.373 But the apparent conflict between the ethical obligations of
an attorney espoused in the Model Rules and the imposition of liability in this
circumstance remains. 7' Therein lies Granewich's greatest implication: The
368. See supra notes 35-37 and accompanying text (discussing fiduciary jurisprudence).
369. See supra notes 115-25 and accompanying text (discussing unique nature of close
corporation fiduciary).
370. See Duncan, supranote 30, at 1140-48 (discussing attorney's malpractice liability for
negligent representation of client).
371.
See supra notes 126-99 and accompanying text (discussing Granewich'sconsistency
with common-law formulations of knowing participation and substantial assistance in liability
for aiding and abetting breach offiduciary duty).
372. See supranotes 344-49 and accompanying text (noting Granewich'sconsistency with
substantive law of agency).
373. See supra notes 354-63 and accompanying text (discussing fiduciary exception to
attorney-client privilege).
374. See supra notes 232-64 and accompanying text (analyzing conflict between Granewich and Model Rules).
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law must redefine an attorney's obligations when representing majority shareholders in the close corporation squeeze-out.
The Restatement(Third)ofthe Law GoverningLawyers may provide the
best approach towards reconciling the conflicts created by Granewich.31
Despite the disclaimer of an attorney's ethical obligation to rectify a client's
breach of fiduciary duty to a non-client in the closely-held corporation conteXt,36 the Restatement (Third)provides that a lawyer who advises a client to
dissolve a legal relationship is civilly liable to a non-client for interference
with that relationship if the lawyer advances the client's interests by the use
of "wrongful means. 3 77 This section provides partial reconciliation of the
inconsistencies of tort law and ethical obligations in the squeeze-out context.
First, the fiduciary relationship is a legal relationship, one that arises by operation of law and in the absence of contract. 3 Second, tort law's imposition of
liability for breach of fiduciary duty clearly indicates that such actions constitute "wrongful means." Thus, an attorney who assists a client in dissolving
a legal relationship through a corporate squeeze-out by means of breach of
fiduciary duty has employed "wrongful means" to dissolve that relationship.
Another solution to the conflicts that Granewich creates may rest in
reconciling the evolving concept of the close corporation fiduciary relationship with an attorney's underlying role in society. Fiduciary jurisprudence is
premised upon protection of the vulnerable. 79 Courts and commentators have
recognized that the realities of the close corporation, wherein majority control
and illiquidity of the investment lead to an inability to protect one's interest,
heighten the vulnerability of the minority.38 ° Perhaps more so than any other
375. See RESTATEMENT (TEmD) OFT-ELAW GOVERNhINGLAWYERS § 78(3) (Preliminary
Draft No. 12, 1996) (discussing lawyer liability for assisting client in dissolution of legal relationship).
376. See id. § 73 cmt h (stating that lawyer's duty to rectify client's breach of fiduciary
duty does not apply when client is corporate officer, director, or controlling stockholder); supra
notes 262-64 and accompanying text (discussing Section 73 of Restatement (Third) of the Law
Governing Lawyers).
377. RESTATEMNT(THiRD)OFTEELAWGOVERNGLAYERS § 78(3)(PreliminaryDraft
No. 12, 1996).
378. See supra note 31 and accompanying text (noting that fiduciary relationship arises by
operation of law).
379. See supra notes 29-39 and accompanying text (discussing development of fiduciary
jurisprudence).
380. See Donahue v. Rodd Electrotype Co., 328 N.E.2d 505, 514-15 (Mass. 1975)
(recounting plight of minority shareholder in close corporation); O'NEAL & THOMPSON, supra
note 3, § 1.03, at 4 (stating that minority shareholder in close corporation "may be deprived of
any effective voice in the making of business decisions"); Thompson, supra note 1, at 702-07
(discussing possibilities for oppression in close corporation).
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fiduciary relationship, the one in the close corporation bears a resemblance in
terms of vulnerability to the guardian-ward relationship. Just like the guardian, the controlling shareholder may possess the final voice in matters affecting those over which he has power. And like the ward of the court, the
minority shareholder may have no ability or means for protecting his interest.
Although the Model Rules do not heighten an attorney's obligations when
representing a majority shareholder,38' the Model Rules do recognize that an
attorney may have enhanced ethical obligations in the representation of a
guardian. 38 A comment to Model Rule 1.14 provides that "[i]f the lawyer
represents the guardian as distinct from the ward, and is aware the guardian
is acting adversely to the ward's interest, the lawyer may have an obligation
to prevent or rectify the guardian's misconduct.138 3 Of course, Rule 1.14 is
directed toward protecting individuals with a "disability."38 4 In a sense, the
minority shareholder in a close corporation is saddled with a legal disability
because he may be denied employment with the corporation, cut-off from all
corporation-related revenue, and trapped with a substantial investment that no
outsider knowingly would assume or purchase.18 In short, the minority shareholder has no ability to shape the operations of the entity once he falls in
disfavor with the controlling shareholders. 8 6 Thus, a reconceptualization of
the attorney's role in a closely-held corporation squeeze-out may resemble the
attorney's role in the guardian-ward relationship and include an ethical obligation to prevent or rectify a majority shareholding client's breach of fiduciary
duty to a minority shareholder.
One formulation of an attorney's ethical obligation is the duty of "nonmaleficence," the duty not to inflict harm on another. 3 7 Of course, zealous
representation of the client is the attorney's preeminent obligation,388 but
"admission to the bar does not create a license to act maliciously, fraudulently,
381. See supra notes 232-64 and accompanying text (discussing Granewich'sconflict vith
Model Rules).
382. See MoDEL RULES OFPROF'LCONDUCTR. 1.14 cmt. 4 (1983) (noting that attorney
representing guardian distinct from ward may have enhanced ethical obligations).
383. Id.
384. See id. (noting that purpose of rule is to protect those with disability).
385. See Donahue, 328 N.E.2d at 514-15. (recounting plight of minority shareholder in
close corporation).
386. See O'NEAL & THOMPSON, supra note 3, § 1.03, at 4 (stating that minority shareholder in close corporation "may be deprived of any effective voice in the making of business
decisions").
387. See Tuttle, supra note 29, at 927 (discussing duty of nonmaleficence).
388. See MODEL CODE OF PROF'LRESPONSIBuTYEC 7-1 (1980) (noting duty to zealously
represent client).
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or knowingly to tread upon the legal rights of others."389 Indeed, the fiduciary
relationship creates certain legal rights for the beneficiary, legal rights designed to protect him from the oppressive and self-interested actions of the
fiduciary." Inthe words of the Oregon Court of Appeals, '"hetort [of aiding
and abetting the breach of fiduciary duty] seeks to protect fiduciary relationships and to promote the worthy goal that fiduciary duties be kept and performed."39' The surest ways to promote that worthy goal are to redefine an
attorney's obligations to rectify a client's breach to minority shareholders in
a corporate squeeze-out and to impose liability upon those who knowingly
provide substantial assistance to the fiduciary's breach.
VMI. Conclusion
Over the last thirty years, the body of corporate law has evolved to reflect
the belief that the close corporation is a conceptually distinct entity from the
publicly-held corporation. 3" The enhancement of fiduciary duties among close
corporation investors best illustrates that evolution. 93 In turn, the protections
afforded to minority shareholders demonstrate that Justice Cardozo's characterization of the nature of the fiduciary's duty as "the punctilio of an honor the
most sensitive" continues to shape our beliefs of corporate governance. 94 In
Granewich v. Harding,the Oregon Supreme Court substantially advanced the
protections due to minority shareholders in a closely-held corporation.39 By
allowing a minority shareholder to state a claim not only against those who
have breached a primary duty, but also against those who provided the legal
expertise to facilitate that breach, Granewich discourages the use of unlawful
means in a corporate squeeze-out.396
As this Note demonstrates, the extension of attorney liability for aiding
and abetting the breach of fiduciary duty to the corporate squeeze-out context
389. Newburger, Loeb & Co. v. Gross, 563 F.2d 1057,1080 (2d Cir. 1977).
390. See Duncan,supranote 30, at 1149-50 (discussing features of fiduciary relationships).
391.
Granewich v. Harding, 945 P.2d 1067,1075 (Or. Ct App. 1997), rev'd,985 P.2d 788
(Or. 1999).
392. See supra notes 1-7 and accompanying text (discussing evolution of law regarding
close corporations).
393. See supra notes 5-7 and accompanying text (noting enhancement of fiduciary duties
in close corporation).
394. See supra note 34 and accompanying text (quoting Cardozo's characterization of
fiduciary duty).
395. See supranote 9 (commenting on Granewich);supra notes 70-1 07 and accompanying
text (discussing Granewich).
396. See supra notes 105-07 and accompanying text (noting conclusion of Granewich
allowing minority shareholders to state claim against defendant-attorneys).
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is wholly consistent with the substantive law of torts" and agency." Even
though Granewich conflicts with traditional understandings of an attorney's
obligations in a squeeze-out 3 the Oregon Supreme Court properly resolved
the case by protecting the sanctity of the close corporation fiduciary relationship. Granewich's implication is resoundingly clear - the legal profession
must engage in dialogue to redefine the attorney's obligations in the representation of majority shareholders in the closely-held corporation squeeze-out. 4"
And this is only appropriate, for the relationship among shareholders in the
close corporation has evolved into a more complex legal issue in the past three
decades, yet the predominant conceptualization of an attorney's obligations
in the squeeze-out has remained steadfast.

397. See supra notes 126-99 and accompanying text (discussing common-law liability for
aiding and abetting breach of fiduciary duty).
398. See supra notes 344-49 and accompanying text (discussing substantive law of
agency).
399. See supra notes 232-64 and accompanying text (discussing conflicts with ethical

rules).
400. See supra notes 371-91 and accompanying text (promoting new conceptualization of
attorney's obligations in squeeze-outs).

